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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Purpose of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare and contrast 
the thought of Charles Sanders PeiDce and William James in 
two respects: (1) their ideas of reality and (2) their 
doctrines of the continuity of consciousness and its meta-
physical implications. 
2. Justification 
The names of Peirce and James are ~ften linked because 
both were founders of the movement knmin as pragmatism. 
Their pragmatic doctrines are compared not infrequently. 
Philip Wiener, 1 Justus Buchler, 2 and John Dewey3 are among 
those who have compared, at least to some extent, Peirce's 
pragmaticism with James 1 s pragmatism. This thesis excludes 
comparison of their pragmatic doctrines but compares sqme of 
1. Philip Wiener, EATFOP, passim. As a rule, references to 
sources are indicated by abbreviations which are explained. 
in the Bibliography. The author 1 s name should be 
consulted. 
2. Justus Buchler, CPE, pp. 186-174. 
3. John Dewey, "The Pragmatism of Peirce, 11 supplementary 
essay in Charles Sanders Peirce, CLL, pp~ 301-308. 
1 
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the metaphysical perspectives underlying their writings on 
pragmatism as well as on other subjects. 
The first difference considered is that Peirce is a 
metaphysical realist and James is a conceptualist. These 
posit ions will be explained and examined in Chapter II, 'but 
for now suffice it to say that Peirce believes that the 
referents of general ideas are realities apart from the 
particular instances which represent, or "embody" them and 
the minds which apprehend them. Laws and habits also have 
being apart from their particular manifestations. James, on 
the other hand, believes that general ideas are mental con-
structs derived from and referring to particular instances. 
They have no referent apart from their particular manifes-
tations. 
Although this thesis is not concerned with pragmatism 
in itself, it is pertinent ~o point out that the metaphysical 
positions here explored are indicated in each writer's 
statement of the pragmatic maxim. 
2 
In his essay, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" ( 5. 338-410), 1 
published in 1878, Peirce expresses the most famous formu-
lation of his pragmatic maxim: 
1. In accordance with the practice of the editors of 
Peirce's Collected Papers, citations from this source 
will be by volume and paragraph. Thus, 5.388 refers 
to Collected Papers, Volume V, paragraph 388. 
c 
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Consider what effects, that might conceivably 
have practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then, our conception 
of these effects is the whole of our conception 
of the object. (5.402) 
In the same essay he states: 
If beliefs • • • appease the same doubt by pro-
ducing the same rule of action, then no mere 
differences ·in the manner of consciousness of 
them can make them different beliefs • • • • 
Imaginary distinctions are often drawn between 
beliefs which differ on11 in their mode of 
expression •••• (5.398) 
These statements show that for Peirce the meaning of an idea 
resides not in particular, isolated consequences, but in all 
its "conceivable" effects, that is, in the conception of all 
that ever will or ever possibly could result from the idea. 
Particular instances do not adequately represent an idea. 
Further, two beliefs are similar if they produce the same 
"rule of action. tt Particular actions do not indicate the 
full measure of belief. The belief is the general~ 
governing particular instances (5.398, 5.417). 
Even these brief statements on pragmatism reflect 
Peirce's contention that both habits and ideas are living 
realities which are partially represented by particular 
instances but which have being apart from those particulars. 
3 
James's formulation of the pragmatic maxim superficially 
appears to resemble that of Peirce, but closer examination 
reveals a basic difference. James says: 
the effective meaning of any philosophic 
proposition can always be brought down to 
0 
some particular consequence, ~n our future 
practical experience, whether active or 
passive; the point lying rather in the fact 
that the experience must be particular, than 
in the fact that it must be active.l 
James's emphasis on the particular consequences, the particu-
lar sensible effects of an idea, reflects his basic belief 
that reality is of the nature of particular sensible experi-
ences. Ideas have no reality apart from perceiving minds 
and no referents other than particular experiences. Thus, 
even these brief pragmatic.statements h~nt at the writers' 
different metaphysical positions, which are discussed in the 
following chapters. 
Peirce and James also formulate analogous theories of 
the continuity of thought. Both philosophers contend that 
consciousness etfuraces a period of time, for otherwise ~emory 
and the comparison of past and present ideas would not be 
possible~ Thus, knowledge would not be possible. There-
fore, thought, or consciousness, must be continuous. 
But although Peirce and James formulate comparable 
theories of the continuity of thought, their applications of 
this theory differ. Each philosopher uses the continuity he 
finds in thought as a met~physical model which he applies to 
all of reality. Since they have different ideas of reality, 
it is not surprising that they formulate dif~erent ideas of 
1. William James, OER, p. 412. 
4 
its continuity. 
For Peirce continuity is a general idea which has being 
apart from continuous things and the minds perceiving them. 
Continuity is the primary metaphysical principle, for without 
this reality no other reality could endure. For James 
continuity is a concept, a mental operation which describes 
some aspects of experience, but which has no reality apart 
from conceiving minds and the particular experiencesto which 
the mind applies the concept. 
Thus, although both Peirce and James present comparable 
demonstrations of the continuity of thought, they develop 
this principle in different directions according to their 
basic orientation toward realism or conceptualism. Chapter 
III critically examin~s and compares each philosopher's 
demonstration of the continuity of thought and its appli-
cation. 
Thus, although Peirce and James are often connected as 
pragmatists, and although they formulated comparable ideas 
of the continuity of consciousness, their thought represents 
completely different metaphysical perspectives, as they 
themselves realized.1 This thesis will explore some of 
these differences. 
1. Peirce, CP 5.414, 5,466, 5.494, and James, CER, 
p. 412. 
5 
c 
·o 
3. Limitations 
This thesis is limited to two main topics: (1) the 
nature of reality as conceived by Peirce and James, particu-
larly as their theories are related to their respective 
positions of realism and conceptualism; (2) the continuity 
of thought and its metaphysical implications as conceived by 
Peirce and James. Their ideas will be compared and contrasted 
throughout. 
This thesis does not consider the pragmatism of Peirce 
and James or their respective theories of truth. It does not 
consider Peirce's logic or his mathematics. Only his non-
mathematical theories of continuity are considered, and they 
are discussed exclusively in relation to his doctrine of the 
continuity of consciousness and its metaphysical applica-
tions. Peirce's semiosis is considered only briefly in 
connection with the continuity of thought and his conjec.ture 
of the nature of the universe. 
This thesis does not discuss James's radical empiricism. 
Although there is frequent reference to James's writings on 
psychology, the use of this material is restricted to its 
contribution to the two main topics of discussion. With the 
exception of the analogy suggested by his theory of the conti-
nuity of consciousness, this thesis does not consider James's 
philosophy of religion. 
6 
4. The Methodology of the Thesis 
Chapter II discusses and compares the nature of reality 
as conceived by Peirce and James. Beginning with a brief 
explanation of realism and conceptualism, it examines and 
cr.iticizes Peirce's realism in connection with his three 
modes of being, the referents of general terms, the active 
force of ideas, and the reality of laws. The same chapter 
then examines James's conceptualism in connection with the 
formulation of conceptions, the referents of universal con-
ceptions, and the conceptual systems expressed as laws. His 
theory of the nature of reality is discussed and compared 
with that of Peirce. 
Chapter III discusses and compares the two philosophers' 
theories of the continuity of consciousness and contrasts the 
metaphysical implications resulting therefrom. It first 
examines each writer's understanding of continuity as it 
pertains to the nature of thought. It briefly considers 
each writer's notion of consciousness and then analyzes :in 
detail their respective demonstrations of the continuity of 
consciousness. The chapter compares their demonstrations 
and tmen discusses their contrasting metaphysical doctrines. 
Chapter IV summarizes the main findings of the thesis. 
0 
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CHAPTER II 
REALrrY 
This chapter will compare the theory of reality a~ con-
ceived by Peirce and James. It considers their conflicting 
views as the dispute between realism and conceptualism, 
presents each writer's justification of his position, and 
correlates it with his theory of the nature of reality. 
1. Definitions of Reality 
Both Peirce and James believe in realities existing 
independently of human consciousness. Peirce declares that 
the fundamental hypothesis 0f the scientific method is that 
there are Real things, whose characters are 
entirely independent of our opinions about 
them; those Heals affect our senses according 
to regular laws. • • • (5.384) 
He defines the real as, "that which is not whatever we happen 
to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it." 
(8.12) Peirce also formulates what appears to be a second 
definition: 
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate, is what we 
mean by the truth, 'and the object represented 
in this opinion is the real. (5.407) 
Although these two notions of reality appear to be 
8 
contradictory, the second evolves from the first. 1 The first 
definition distinguishes the externally real from the 
fictitious. 
A figment is a product of somebody's imagination; 
it has such characters as his thought impresses 
upon it. That those characters are independent 
of how you or I think is an external reality. 
There are, however» phenomena within our own minds, 
dependent upon our thought, which are at the same 
time real in the sense that we really think them. 
But though their characters depend on how we think, 
they do not depend on what we think those charac-
ters to be. (5.405) 
For instance, the content of a dream depends on what the 
dreamer dreamt it to be. But once it has occurred, the 
content of the dream cannot be altered by anyone's opinion. 
A dream is a real mental phenomenon. "Thus we may define the 
real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody 
may think them to be." ( 5. 405) Since a mental object cannot 
be altered once it has been created, in this sense it is as 
real as an extra-mental one. 
To determine whether an object has a mental or extra-
mental reality, Peirce proposes three "tests of externality." 
(6:l"334) These are (1) attempted suppression of the apparition 
by an effort of will, (2) testimony of othe~· observers, and 
(3) evidence of upb~sical concomitants, 1t such as photography 
and seismography. Since these tests are notoriously falliRle, 
the determination of external reality involves an endless, 
1. Edward C. Moore, AP:PJ.D, p. 59. 
self-corrective process. Therefore, we can know how something 
is independently of how any one observer perceives it only in 
an indefinit~ future when an unlimited community of observers 
have scientifically examined the object. This results in the 
second definition of reality, namely the object represented 
in the opinion fated to be ultimately reached. By 11fate 11 
Peirce means, 1tthat which is sure to come true, and can nohow 
be avoided •••• We are all i'ated to die." {5.407 n.) Thus, 
while there are real entities, the nature of which is inde-
pendent of the opinion of any finite· group of observers, it 
is inevitable that a community of observers scientifically 
studying such entities will ultimately know their real 
natures if the investigation continues long enough. 
But although Peirce and James both believe in inde-
pendent, extra-mental reali·by, they disagree on the nature of 
such reality. Their differences represent the conflict 
between realism aqd conceptualism. 
2. Realism and Conceptualism 
The conflict between realism and conceptualism concerns 
the reference and correspondence of genera·l, or universal, 
terms to things existing ou·bside the intellect. A gene:ral 
term, or general concept, is one which applies to more than 
one individual on the ground that the individuals to which it 
applies possess at least some attributes in common. 1 "Man," 
1. R. Adamson, "General Term, 11 in James Mark Baldwin, DPP, 
Vol. I, p. 407. 
10 
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"red,-11 "walk," "triangle" are general terms as are more 
abstract terms such as "humanity," "honesty, 11 njustice." In 
fact, all terms except proper names, indexical pronouns, 
prepositions, and articles are general according to the above 
definition. The question is whether or not there are e~tra­
mental realities corresponding to general terms, and, if so, 
if they have a reality apart from the individuals possessing 
the attributes which render the term applicable to those 
individuals. 
There are three major answers to this question, each 
admitting a number of variations. This section briefly 
;• 
defines the three major positions of realism, nominalism, and 
conceptualism. A detailed examination of these positions is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but sections 3 and 4 discuss 
the professed positions of Feirce and James and scrutinize 
their respective applications of these metaphysical pers,pec-
tives. 
11 
To explain realism and nominalism, Feibleman dis-
tinguishes the two metaphysical levels of being and existence.1 
Being is an extra-physical reality also known as possibflity, 
the realm of universals, the realm of archetypes. It is 
known not by the senses but by reason, although its reality 
is independent of the human mind. The realm of being may 
consist of mental forms as it does for Plato, or real 
1. James Feibleman, TROR, p. 5. 
lfessences" as it does for Santayana, or of ideas within the 
divine mind as it does for Berkeley. Being usually_is con-
ceived as eternal, changeless, undivided, perfect. 
Existence is the world known to the senses. It is also 
called actuality, materiality, the realm of particulars, and 
the realm of facts. It consists of phy•Slical particulars. 
Existence is temporal, changing, divided, and imperfect. 
Realism may attribute reality to existence, but it· is 
distinguished by its insiste1nce upon the reality of being. 
Within the realm of being, universal terms have a real 
correspondent. Thus, univer1sals are real apart from the 
existents which bear the names of universals. Universals 
are real ante ~' that is, before the ~hings of existence, 
as well as in rebus, or in the things which embody them. 
Since they can be mentally perceived, universals are real 
£OSt ~~ or in their ap?rehension by human minds. 1 
12 
Nominalism recognizes only the realm of existence. Only 
physical particulars are real. Values and laws are not. 2 
Since there are no general things, there can be no general 
ideas and no real generals. Thus, nominalism is: 
the doctrine that universals have no objective 
existence or validity; in its extreme rorm, 
1. Baldwin, DPP, Vol. II, P• 421. 
2. Feibleman, TROR, p. 7. 
that they are only nrunes ••• that is, 
creations of language for purposes of con-
venient communication.l 
A~cording to nominalism, general ideas are not even fictions, 
for there can be nothing in the mind which is not outside the 
mind. What are called general ideas are only names, or even 
noises. 2 
13 
A mediating view between these two extremes is that of 
conceptualism which, like nominalism, denies hypostatic 
reality to universals and wbich, like realism, denies that 
universals are merely names. 3 Conceptualism says that there 
are universal ideas in the mind but there are only particular 
things outside the mind. By comparing particular experiences, 
the mind selects similar attributes and, by compounding them, 
formulates general concepts. Thus, universals have an 
epistemological reality in the concepts wherein the intelli-
gence grasps the similarity in different things. Ontologi-
cally they are grounded in the fact that particular objects 
do have attributes which are apprehended in a unity. 4 
Both Peirce and James reject nominalism because they 
maintain that we ~ and do have general ideas, 5 and tht!tt the 
1. John Dewey" "Nominalism," in Baldwin" D:BP, Vol. II" p. 180.,v 
2. Moore, AP:PJD, p. 26. 
3. Frederick Tracy, "Conceptualism, n in James Hastings, ERE, 
Vol. III, p. 799. 
4. ~., p. 800. 
5. James, PSY I, p. 470, and Peirce, CP, 5.301. 
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ability to formulate such ideas is essential to science and 
discursive knowledge. Peirce professes to be a realist and 
James claims to be a conceptualist. This chapter examines 
the respective positions of Peirce and James and relates 
their divergent views to their correspondingly different 
ideas of the nature of reality. 
3. Peirce's Realism 
Peirce would agree with Feibleman that the dispute 
between r·ealism and conceptualism centers in the fact that 
conceptualism recognizes only one mode of reality~ 
the being of an individual thing or fact, 
••• which consists in the object's crowding 
out a place for itself in the universe, • • • 
and reacting by brute force of fact against 
all other things. I call that existence. 
(1.21) 
Peirce demonstrates his realism.by describing existence as 
only one of three modes of being. These can be observe~ in 
elements of whatever is at any time before the 
mind in any way. They are the being of posi-
tive qualitative possibility, the being of 
actual fact, and the being of law that will 
govern facts in the future. (1.23) 
The modes of being are universally applicable and have 
different referents in the various areas to which Peirce 
applies them. For instance~ the three kinds of signs are 
icons, indices, and symbols. The formal structures of phe-
nomena are monads, dyads, and triads. The most universal 
elements revealed by ordinary experience are quality, fact, 
14: 
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and law. Peirce also refers to the three modes of being as 
three universes of experience (5.455), three modes of reality 
(6.342), the list· of categories (1.300), and as firstness, 
secondness, and thirdness (1.25). 
i. Firstness 
Firstness is nthe Idea of that which is such as it is 
regardless of anything else." (5.66) The idea of the first 
is absolutely separated from the conception of anything els·e. 
It is that which is immediately present to consciousness' 
before it can be cognized or considered as the object of 
sensation caused by an other (1.357). It cannot be asserted, 
"for assertien always implies a denial of something else. 
Stop to think of it, and it has flown!" (1.357) All qu~lities, 
such as red, hard, sweet, and all feelings are firsts because 
of their qualitative uniqueness. 
Peirce insists that firstness is general. His defi-
nition of a general term agrees with that of Adamson in sec-
tion 2, for Peirce says a general term is, "quod natum aptum 
!!:!?. dici de multis." (5.102) Loosely translated., a general 
term is one which may be spoken, or predicated, of many. The 
terms representing qualities and feelings may be predicated 
of many existents and therefore are general. But Peirce 
maintains that these terms represent qualities and feelings 
which are real apart from their physical manifestations and 
that these realities are general. 
• 
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Their gene~ality is explained by their mode of being 
which is that of possibility. That is, firstness cannot 
exist because that which exists does so in relation to .an 
other. However, it is meaningless to say that that which has 
no relation to or reaction with anything else has any being 
at all unless it is such that it may possibly come into re-
lation with others (1.25). "An element separated from every-
thing else and in no world but itself, may be said, when we 
come to reflect upon its isolation, to be merely po·tential. 11 
(1.424) But for Peirce, possibility is a reality. It is a 
being apart from existence. Thus, all qualities, such as 
redness or hardness, were real qualitative possibilities even 
before anything in the universe was red or hard. 
Possibles are general because_they do not refer to any 
particular. Their mode of being is their possibility of 
being actualized in any existent but it is E£i their actuali-
zation in an existent. That which can possibly be actua~ized 
in any existent is not determinate because it is not actual-
ized in any particular. Since it is possible for the quali-
ties to be predicated of many, they are general. Belief in 
the independent reality of the referents of general terms 
representing qualities is one aspect of Peirce's realism. 
Lest the reality of possibility seem questionable, 
Peirce says that we naturally attribute real possibility to 
outward objects, for we assume them to have capacities which 
0 
have not been realized and which may never be realized, yet 
we can know nothing of these capacities until they are 
realized. We consider these unrealized capacities to be real 
possibilities (1.25). 
To prove that the possible does not need actualization 
to become real, Peirce states that the reality of the quality 
red does not depend on anybody's seeing it (1.422). If a 
conceptualist argues that red things are no longer red when 
in the dark, Peirce refutes this position by showing that the 
conceptualist must then believe one of two things. If the 
red body in the dark no longer is able to transmit the light 
at the lower end of the spectrum, then either it has acquired 
the opposite property or it ha~ become indeterminate in this 
respect. If the conceptualist believes that it has acquired 
the opposite quality and is able to absorb the long waves of 
the spectrum, he has admitted that qualities are real when 
not perceived, although he has admitted this of qualities for 
which there is no evidence. On the other hand, if he claims 
that the object has become indetermina,:b·e· in regard to the 
property not perceived, 11 then, since this is the case at 
1 
any 
moment in regard to the vast majority of the qualities of all 
bodies," (1.422) he again admits that generals exist, for 
they must suddenly become manifest in an object when an 
observer arrives. 
The fallacy in Peirce's argument lies in his changing 
the original question, so that he does not disprove that 
17 
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which the conceptualist position actually asserts. The con-
ceptualist believes that there are particular red objects but 
that the quality "redness" is a concept formulated by the 
perceiving mind which experiences red objects. The statement 
that a body which looks red under certain lighting conditions 
does not look red in the dark does not mean that the ob~ect is 
no longer capable of transmitting light at the lower end of 
the_spectrum. It merely means that the object is not now 
transmitting this light because no such light is present. How-
ever, the object retains the capacity to transmit the light 
when the light is present. Peirce wou~d claim that this 
capacity is the possibility of redness which is a real general 
-1 even when the object is in the dark. But the conceptualist 
could reply that this capacity is E£1 a real, unembodied 
general, but is a dispositional property of the object consist-
ing in the molecular structure of its surface. The surface 
molecules react in a certain way in the presence of light; 
they remain in the object in the absence ·of light but they 
must react in a particular manner before the quality of ~ed­
ness can be experienced. In this respect, redness must always 
be a property of an existing object in order to be real. 
Peirce would agree that the reactions of molecules cause the 
perception of redness but he maintains that the molecules re-
act in a certain way because they conform to a real law w,hich 
is a general. This will be discussed in connection with 
., 
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thirdness. Further, he contends that redness is a real 
possibility even when there are no red OBJECTS. Despite 
Peirce's misconstr.ual of the conceptualist position, the 
important point is that for him possibilities have a mode of 
being apart from physical existence. The reality of possi-
bility as a mode of being is a major aspect of Peirce's 
realism. 
Peirce's belief in real qualitative possibilities ,is 
subject to the same questions which Aristotle asked about 
Plato's Forms •1 How many possibilit·ies are there? Peir~e 
says, ttanything whatever, hov1ever complex and heterogeneous, 
has its quality sui generis, its p.ossibility of sensation 
11 That is, anything may be ·considered in terms pf • • • • 
its "qualitative suchness,n without reference to anything 
else. If every qualitative suchness is a real qualitative 
- ' possibility, then Peirce's reality is heavily populated. In 
addition to existents there are real, ~actualized possi~ 
bilities. Quine asks, 11How many possible men are there in 
that doorway? Are there more possible thfun ones than fat 
ones?"2 Peirce avoids this type of "population explosion't by 
saying that not all generals are real. That is, not all 
1 •. Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. ~nd trans. John Warrington 
{London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., New York: E. P. Dutton 
& Go., Inc., 1956), p. 75. 
2. Willard Van Orman Quine, FALPOV, p. 4. 
.-
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general terms correspond to a reality, either possible or 
actual. Those general terms which do not have a real corre-
spondent must represent a fiction; that is, they are ideas 
which are real in somebody's imagination but which have no 
extra-mental correspondent. 
However, how are we to distinguish the real possibles 
from the fictitious possibles? If the only rlistinguishing 
feature of the real possibles is that eventually they are 
realized in things whereas. the fictitious are not, then 
Peirce appears close to the nominalist position that general 
ideas refer to the particular attributes of particular things 
and have no referents apart from the world of existence. 
Peirce rejects this position by saying that although the 
\ 
reality of a possibility is not apprehended until the possi-
bility has become actual, the real possibles are real even 
when they are not actual. 
A possibility remains possible when it is not 
actual. The sensation is requisite for its 
apprehension; but no sensation nor sense-faculty 
is requisite for the possibility which is the 
being of the quality. ( 1. 422) 
But although real possibilities are real apart from the 
actuals which manifest them and the minds which perceive 
them, we have no way of distinguishing real, unactualized 
possibles from fictitious possibles. 
But even if tbe only real possibles are those which we 
know to be actualized and apprehended by our feelings, Peirce 
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• still encounters a "population problem." I.f every reality . I 
can be considered just as it is without relation to anything 
else and i.f this "suchness"' is a real possibility, there 
must still be a plethora o.f possibilities to account .for all 
the qualities in reality. For instance, in addition to the 
qualitative possibility o.f redness, there must be the possi-
bility o.f dark redness, and a possibility o.f a redness darker 
than dark redness. In short, there must be a possibility o.f 
every· hue o.f red and of every kind of darkness. Some economy 
might be ·achieved by positing one possibility of redness,, 
another possibility of darkness, and another possibility o.f 
relations between the two. But there still is a cumbers'ome 
number of possibilities, .for there must be many possibilities 
of nore,and less of the relation to allow for the distinction 
between dark redness, darker redness, and still darker 
redness. 
Presumably the major objection to such a plethora o.f 
possibilities is an aesthetic one. As Quine remarks, "It 
offends the aesthetic sense o.f those of us who have a taste 
for desert landscapes, •••• n1 That Peirce either did not 
realize that his possibilities could achieve such a multitude, 
or that he wished to avoid such a multitude is indicated by 
his statement: 
1. Quine, FALPOV, p. 4. 
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Imagine at once a toothache, a splitting head-
ache, a jammed finger, a corn on the foot, a 
burn, and a colic, not necessarily existing at 
once -- leave that vague -- and attend not to , 
the parts of the imagination but to the 
resultant impression. That will give an idea 
of a general quality of pain. (1.424) 
But this statement overlooks the differences in kinds and 
I, 
degrees of pain. For instance, a minor burn has a different 
qualitative feeling than does a major burn. There are still 
more qualitative differences between the pain which accom-
panies a particular burn and the pain which accompanies a 
jammed finger. Further, there is a qualitative difference 
22 
in the pain which accompanies the jammed top of the third 
finger on the right hand and that which accompanies the jammed 
second jpint of the second finger of the left hand. If 
Peirce attributes real possibility to the qualitative feeling 
of pain, then by logical extension, he should be willing, to 
attribute real possibility to every kind and every degree of 
pain. There should be a real possibili~y of the feeling, 
ttthird-toe-on-the-right-foot-moderately..;stubbed-from-the-
top-joint" and another real possibility of the feeling; 
"thumb-on-the-right-hand-burned-to-the-second-degree-at-the-
tip-but-under-medicat~on-and-therefore-qualitatively-different­
from-what-it-was-three-days-ago. 111 
1. This is a form of Parmenides' criticism of Socrates' 
Forms • See Francis MacDonald Cornford ( ed. ) , Plato and 
Parmenides (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 
pp. 81-4. 
Peirce might try to justify his position by pointing to 
his insistence that firstness represents the monadic aspect 
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of a reality; that it considers only the total feeling i~ its 
uniqueness without reference to its parts or to its relations. 
Therefore, he would say, the rotions of pain of "thumb-on-the-
right-hand-burned-to-the-second-degree ••• 11 does not repre-
sent the pain as it is in itself without referenDa to an!-
thing else, but considers the pain in its explicit relations. 
But such a contention is not jus·tified because such a pain 
considered as a whole feels differently rrom any other pain. 
The pain of the burned thumb considered as a whole differs 
qualitatively from the pain of a jammed finger or a stubbed 
toe. Thus, if pain is a real possibility, different kinds of 
pain must be real possibilities, and each variation of each 
kind of pain must, by logical extension, be a real possi-
bility. Peirce may not object to such a heavily populated 
world of possibilities, but the above quotation does not 
seem to recognize its magnitude. 
ii. Secondness 
Secondness is the "mode of being of one thing which 
consists in how a second ~bjetet is." (1.24) Epistemolog;t.:. 
cally it is 
the Idea of that which is such as it is as 
being Second to some First, regardless of any-
thing else, and in particular regardless of 
any Law, although it may conform to a law. 
That is to say, it is Reaction as an element 
of the Phenomenon. (5.66) 
\. Secondness is the mode of existence, of actuality. It ~s 
completely determinate, for the actuality of an event ''con-
sists in its happening then and there.tt (1.24) An existing 
individual represents secondness, for it exists in a time and 
place, and therefore in relation to an other. Phenomenologi-
I 
cally, secondness involves the sense of effort and resi~tance~ 
of attracting and repelling another. 
Second~ess is irrational, for 
Actuality is something brute. I instance putting 
your shoulder against a door and trying to forc·e 
it open against an unseen, silent, and unknown , 
resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness 
of effort and resistance, which seems to me to 
come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. 
(1.24) 
Actuality, or existence, then, involves the double conscious-
ness of the self and the not-self. This consciousness h~s 
two varieties. One is the consciousness of acting on others 
and the other is the perception of being acted on by others 
(1.324). 
Secondness necessarily involves firstness. "A thing 
cannot be other, negative, or independent, without a first 
to or of which it shall be other, negative, or independent." 
(1.358) Also, experience of an existent is not possible with-
out perception of its qualities (5.436),. But firstness 
necessarily excludes secondness, for that which is as it is 
regardless of anything else cannot involve anything else. 
Expressed qifferently, actuality involves possibility, fo~ 
only that which is possible can become actual. Thus, 
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"possibility is mre than the actual, nl f'or "a possibility 
remains possible only when it is not actual." (1.422) but the 
actual remains actual only if it is possible for it to remain 
actual. Theref'ore, the actual evolves f'rom and requires the 
possible, which is general (1.453),. 
A paradox attaches to secondness. It is the mode .of 
being of that which is in relation to something else. A re-
lation is "a fact relative to a number of objects consid'ered 
apart f'rom those objects." (3.466) Thus, relation is general, 
since it applies to many, rather than to a particular in~i­
vidual. But, second$are individuals and therefore are not 
general. To be completely individual, a reality must be com-
pletely independent of its relations, for relatedness is 
generality. But that which is considered apart from its 
relatedness is a first. Peirce says that seconds are seconds 
because they stand in relation to a first. Thus, their 
relatedness is essential to their secondness. Their gener-
ality is essential to their indivtduality. In fact, since 
relatedness makes individuals individual, relatedness is the 
nature of individuals. Their relatedness is their individu-
ality. Their generality is their individual~ty. 
Peirce would object to this paradox by saying it fails 
to distinguish existents from their relatedness. Existents 
are individual, their relations are general. But this does 
1. Feibleman, AITPP, p. 187. 
not eliminate the paradox, for the essential feature of indi-
I 
viduals is that they exist in relation to an other, for· 
instance in relation to a time and place. To consider a 
reality apart from all its relations is to consider it as a 
first. Therefore, secondness must admit that generality which 
belongs to its relatedness. 
Peirce might try to evade this paradox by claimin~ that 
the class of relations is general but that ~ relation betl'leen 
seconds is not general because it applies here and nmv to 
particular second~. Thus, it is a particular relation and is 
devoid of generality. But even a particular relation is: in a 
sense general, for, as remarked above, Peirce defines a re-
lation as "a fact relative to a number of objects •• • • 
(3.466) Since the relation is relative to more than one par-
ticular, it can be predicated of more than one particular and 
therefore is general. Peirce probably would remind us t~at 
according to his definition the relation is to be considered 
apart from the particulars which it relates; therefore, it is 
not to be considered as a predicate of any existents. But a 
relation considered in itself is still general because its 
being consists in its being relative to more than one reality 
even though it is considered apart from those realities to 
which it is relative. When it is considered apart from 
everything else, including its terms, it is a first which· is 
general. When it is considered with its terms it applies to 
2 6 
0 
more than one fact and therefore is general, even though -it 
may apply only to a very limited group of facts for a very 
limited duration. For instance, it may apply only to two 
terms for an instantaneous here and now. 
Peirce's contention that seconds exist "regardless of 
any Lawn (5.66) also is questionable. 1The subsequent dis-
cussion of thirdness reveals that relation, generality, and 
law are thirdness. Further, they are all synonymous (1~345, 
1.420). Therefore, if seconds are to be considered in rela-
tion to a first, and if, to be considered as seconds they 
cannot be separated from their relatedness, then they cannot 
be considered apart from law. 
Again, Peirce might object that the class of relations 
represents law but that ~ particular relation between par-
ticular seconds is a brute fact which happens only once, here 
and now, and therefore is not governed by law. But, since 
generality and law are synonymous and since even a particular 
relation is general, as seen above, then seconds must admit 
of such law as will permit relatedness to an other. Peirce 
would reply that such a notion represents secondness as it 
is governed by thirdness. It does not represent secondness 
in itself, which is brute fact. 
iii. Thirdness 
Thirdness is the mode of being represented by "the 
medium or connecting bond between the absolute first and 
last.." (1.337) "It is that which is what it is by virtue of 
imparting a quality to reactions in the future" (1.343), ·the 
relation of connection between firstness and secondness. 
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Thirdness is synonymous with representation, or meaning, 
because in this relationship mediation reaches its fullest 
development (5.104-5). Peirce explains this as follo-vrs,: A 
word is a sign for its object. A general term stands for 
more than one object. For instance, the word "sun" repre-
sents all OQjeets of a given type. 
Take any two possible objects that might be 
called ~ and, however much alike they may 
be, any multitude whatsoever of intermediate 
suns are alternatively possible, and therefore 
• • • these !ntermediate possible suns 
transcend all multitude. (5.103) 
Since an infinite variety of objects could exist between any 
two objects represented by a sign, the relation of between-
ness or mediation, achieves its fullest expression in repre-
sentation. 
The triadic nature of meaning is evident in the very 
function of a sign. "That for which it stands is called its 
object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to 
'tihich it gives rise, its interpretant." (1.339) 
Also, representation is mediation, or .thirdness, b~­
cause a sign relates to future conduct and therefore imparts 
a definite character to future acts of secondness. 
The meaning of a word really lies in the way 
in which it might, in a proper position in a 
proposition believed, tend to mould the conduct 
of a person into conformity to that to which it 
is itself moulded. • • • it is only in doing so 
that its own being consists. (1.343) . 
Me.aning is always general because that which relates to 
the future is always general, for no collection of past or 
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present events can equal the character or number of future 
events (1.26). Future events are always indeterminate, al-
though certain tendencies are predictable (1.26). 
If a prediction has a decided tendency to be fulfilled, 
it is because the future events tend to conform to a general 
law. For Peirce, a law is more than a mental formula imposed 
on observed facts. For instance, if the law of gravitation 
were merely a formula establishing a relation between terms, 
"what in the world should induce a stone , which is not a term 
I 
nor a concept but just a plain thing, to act in conformity to 
that uniformity? 11 ( 5.48) For Peirce laws are realities capa-
ble of producing physical effects. Stones fall to the earth 
because there is a real law of gravity compelling them to do 
so. Laws are realities governing the events in the manner 
represented by the formula. "This mode of being which 
consists, • • • in the fact that future acts of Secondnes~s 
will take on a determinate general character I call a T~ird­
ness." (1.26) Thus, general propositions which express laws 
have real referents in the realm of tnirdness. 
Laws produce effects because they are thoughts (1~345, " 
1.420). All thoughts including laws, are physically oper-
ative (1.213). An idea without efficiency is absurd, for, 
Imagine such an idea if you can! Have you done 
so? Well, where did you get this idea? If it 
was communicated to you viva ~ from another 
person, it must have had efficiency enough to 
get the particles of air vibrating. If you read 
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it in a newspaper, it had set a monstrous 
printing press in motion. I£ you thought 
it out yoursel£, it bad caused something to 
happen in your brain. (1.213) 
Ideas are not creations o£ the mind, but rather, they "have 
a power o£ £inding or creating their vehicles." (1.217) 
That is, minds apprehend ideas, but minds do not create them. 
'
1The soul does for the idea just what the ·cellulose does for 
the beauty o£ the rose; ~hat is to say, it affords it oppor-
tunity." (1.216) Ideas are effective intrinsically, not· be-
cause o£ the men who practice them. Instead, the idea creates 
its defenders and makes them powerful (1.217). 
If it be that freemasonry or its foe, the Papacy, 
ever pass away--as perhaps either may--it will 1 
be precisely because they are ideas devoid of 
inherent, incorruptible vitality; and not at all 
because they have been unsupplied with stalwart 
defenders. (1.217) 
A real ,idea which is not apprehended by a mind is a 
real possibility. It "must be embodied (or ensouled--it is 
all one) in order to attain complete beingn (.l!t218), but 
until it is so "embodied" or 11 ensouled" it is a potential 
being. When they are embodied or apprehended, all ideas have 
"generative lifen (1.219) whereby they exert force. Peirce's 
conjecture as to why ideas can act on matter is revealed 'in 
the discussion of his cosmogony in Chapter III. 
Peirce equates all triadic relations with meaning 
(1.345). Law is a matter of meaning because it relates to 
future conduct and is the basis of prediction. Thought is 
synonymous with meaning because a thought is a sign (5.251). 
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"Giving" is analyzable to meaning because if A gives B to C, 
then A transfers the right of property B to C. Transfer of 
property involves law, and law involves meaning (1.346). 
Further, meaning is synonymous with thought (1.345, 1.420). 
Thirdness is always general because both meaning and 
thought are general. 
A thought is general. I had it. I imparted 
it to you. It is general on that side. It 
is also general in referring to all possible 
things, and not merely to those which happen 
to exist. No collection of facts can consti-
tute a law; for the law goes beyond any 
accomplished facts and determines how facts 
that may be, but all of which never can have 
happened,-shall be characterized. (1.420) 
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Thus, thirdness is generality and is of the nature of thought. 
Besides law and meaning, thirdness includes "infinity, conti-
nuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence.n (1.340) These 
are realities which correspond to general terms. The 
reality of continuity, diffusion, and growth will be dis-
cussed in Chapter III. 
Thus, Peirce's realism consists in the reality of 
possibility, of laws, and of ideas which have being and force 
apart from the minds which apprehend them and the instances 
which represent them. These realities are generals. There-
fore, generals are real and general terms and propositions 
have real referents in the realms of firstn~ss and third~ess. 
Peirce's realistic doctrine encounters several diff.i-
culties. First, he is anxious to avoid the hypostatization 
of ideas. He says that ideas do not "call new matter into 
• existence" (1.220) and condemns such a supposition as "pure 
intellectualism" (1,220). But, because ideas are real possi-
bilities before they are actualized, and because they find 
and even create the minds and experiences which express them, 
they do seem to have hypostatic reality. 
On the other hand, many of Peirce's statements about 
thirdness and about generality appear to contradict his 
realism. Nagel points out that despite his insistence upon 
the reality of possibility and of generality, Peirce's 
generals often are tied to particular things. 1 This is 
especially true of his attribution of force and efficiency 
to ideas. "For to endow la1vs with efficacy is to particular-
ize them into things, and is an invitation to the nominalist 
2 to ask his unanswerable 'When? Where?'" Undoubtedly Peirce 
would disclaim the nominalist position by saying that the 
instances of force are only particular manifestations of an 
idea which remains possible even when it is not operative,. 
But Peirce himself attributes force to the realm of existence 
in his remark that "blind force is an element of experience 
distinct from rationality in logical force." (1.220) Un-
doubtedly he would say that ideas have "logical force 11 which 
is not restricted to the world of existence. 
1. Ernest Nagel, SR, pp. 76-7. 
2. Ibid., p. 77. 
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Other statements conflict.wi~h Peirce's declared 
realist position. For instance~ referring to the law of 
,, 
gravitation he says, "nobody can imagine that law to have 
any being of any kind if it were impossible th~t there should 
exist any two masses of matter • • • • " {1. 3.04) This implies 
that the reality of the law of gravitation consists in t,he 
possibility of its being embodied. Thus, this statement 
suggests a conceptualistic position. 
Elsewhere~ Peirce says the realist be,lieves that, 
whether the word "hard" itself be real or not~ 
the property, the character, th~ predicate 
hardness, is not invented by men as the word is, 
but is really and truly in the hard things and 
is one in them all, as a description of habit, 
disposition, or behavior • • • • {1.27 n.) 
This states that hardness is in hard things but does not 
assert its reality apart from hard objects. It suggests a 
nominalistic position, which Peirce would avoid by asserting 
that although hardness is in hard objects, it also is real 
independently of its physical manifestations. 
The following passage in "How to Make Our Ideas Olear," 
written in 1878, contradicts the above quotation and also is 
inconsistent with Peirce's realism. 
There is absolutely no difference between a hard 
thing and a soft thing so long as they are not 
brought to the test. Suppose~ then, that a dia-
mond could be crystallized in the midst of a 
cushion of soft cotton, and should remain there 
until it was finally burned up. Would it be 
foolish to say that that diamond was soft? 
{5.403) 
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He concludes that it would not be false to say that such a 
diamond is soft because this statement presents "no fact to 
be different from what it is." (5.403) This passage implies 
that qualities and ide~s are real only when actualized. It 
represents a c·onceptualisti.c po-sd..t~bn •. .-·.~-:..: · 
' 
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Another striking violation of Peirce's realist position 
is found in his remark: 11Numb~rs are .merely a system of 
names devised by men for the purpose of counting." (1.149) 
Only a nominalist would make that statement. 
Thus, ·qespite his intricate formulation of the three 
modes of being which support his realism, Peirce's writings 
are not always consistent with that positi0n. As a professed 
realist, he insists that generality, or universality, has 
reality; therefore universal terms have real referents. 
In fact, Peirce declares that all reality is general. 
Firstness and thirdness are general by nature, but even 
secondness must be affected by the generality of its relation, 
as discussed above. Peirce further maintains that not only 
is reality general, but reality is thirdness, is relation 
between secondness and firstness (5.121). The fact that 
reality is thirdness, rather than firstness or secondne·ss·, is 
probably due to Peirce's contention that thirdness cannot. be 
reduced to secondness and that neither of these modes can be 
reduced to firstness. This will be discussed in connection 
with James's concept of .feeling (P.J> •• ,_63)-:1:).But since firstness 
0 
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and secondness are essential to thirdness, and are real ~nde­
pendently of thirdness, they must also be real. However, 
the emphasis on reality as thought and representation will 
be developed in Cllapter III • 
.. 
Peirce's concept of the three modes of being supports 
his contention that general qualities and principles are real 
and therefore that universal terms have real referents. This 
belief constitutes his realism. 
4. James's Conceptualism 
James's conceptualism consists in his explanation of 
universals, which is derived from his account of conception. 
~is theory of the nature of reality is derived from his con-
ceptualism. 
i. Conception 
Conception is nthe function by which a state of min'd 
means to think the same whereof it thought on a former 
occasion."1 Personal thought feels itself to be continuous. 
James metaphorically refers to the felt continuity of 
consciousness. as the "stream of consciousness. 112 There is an 
apt analogy between James's idea of the stream of conscious-
ness and Peirce's doctrine of the continuity of consciousness; 
Chapter III considers that analogy at length. The presen~ 
1. James, PSY I, p. 468 n. 2. . Ibid. , p. 239 
chapter treats James's notion of the stream of consciousness 
only as it relates to his conceptualism. 
James says that parts of the mental stream refer to the 
same matters referred to in other parts. Further, "some of 
these portions can know that they mean the same matters which 
the other portions meant. nl 
The function by which we thus identify a 
numerically distinct and ~ermanent subject of 
discourse is called CONGE TION; and the 
thoughts which are its vehicles are called 
concepts.2 
Conception is "neither the mental state nor what the mental 
state signifies, but the relation between the two, namely the 
function of the mental state in signifying Just that particu-
lar thing. tt 3 It is that function of the mental state which 
can identify its object because it knows it as "the same"' as 
that encountered before. 
This explanation is problematic. First, how can 
consciousness know that a present "subject of discoursen is 
the same as a past one. In order to compare a past idea with 
a present one, the past idea must be present to consciousness 
at the same time as the present one. But the past idea is 
past. Therefore, a present idea cannot be known to be a 
recurrence of a past idea or to be a "replica" of the origi-
nal idea. This dilemma is a commonplace of philosophy, and 
James's attempt to explain it is discussed in Chapter III in 
1. Ibid., p. 459. 
-
2. Ibid., p. 461. 3. Ibid. 
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connection with the continuity of consciousness. But within 
the present context James says that he is not here concerned 
whether there is any real sameness in the object of concep-
tion; he is not concerned whether there is any real sameness 
in the ideas. The point is that uthe mind can always in':tend, 
and knm.r when it intends, to think of the Same. nl 
But if the mind considers two perceptions to be 11the 
same," it must have an idea of sameness. Even if there is no 
sameness in external reality, the mind must have an idea of 
"sameness" in order to ttintend" the same regarding the two 
perceptions. Further, it must know that its present ide~ of 
"the same ft is the same as past ideas of "the same." Where 
does it get this idea of sameness? Is it a real general? 
James would answer negatively, for he attributes the knowledge 
of sameness and difference to the "natural" structure of the 
mind. 2 
Why should difference have popped into our beads 
so invariably • • • ? There must have been 
either a subjective or an objective reason. The 
subjective reason can only be that our minds are 
so constructed that a sense of difference was 
the only sort of conscious transition possible 
between black and white; the objective reason 
can only be that difference was always there, 
••• as an objective fact •••• The objective:, 
reason simply says that if an outer difference ' 
is there the mind must needs know it--which is 
no reason at all, but a mere appeal to the fact 
that the mind does know what is there.3 
Thus, James accepts it as an ultimate fact that the mind does 
1. ~., p. 460. 2. Ibid., II, p. 643. 3. Ibid. 
appr~hend sameness and difference in its perceptions even 
though we do not know why this should be so. The mind need 
not compare its perceptions, but when it does do so it knows 
that some of its perceptions are the same and that some are 
different from each other. 
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james might seem to be taking a realist position here, 
for if some perceptions are the same and others are different, 
there is real sameness and real difference. Therefore, the 
ideas "sameness" and "difference" are general ideas which have 
real correspondents. Since there are two real generals, 
there may well be others. But James denies that sameness and 
difference are generals, for they have no reality apart from 
the minds conceiving them and the particular instances to 
which these conceptions apply. Sameness and difference are 
conceptions which the mind applies to certain relations among 
particular existents. 
But how does the mind formulate these conceptions? 
Conceptions are derived from perceptions which will be shown 
to be derived from sensations. James himse~f says that the 
relations of similarity and difference are not objects of 
t . 1 sensa J.on. Two sensations are two sensations; in themselves 
they proclaim neither "samen~ss" nor 11 difference.n These 
relations are supervened upon experience by the mind. But 
since sense experience does not provide the data for concep-
tions of these relations, what does provide such data? 
1. Ibid., p. 632. 
James does not believe that these conceptions are 
modeled on an archetypal "samenessn and "difference" because 
such a belief' represents a realistic position. He believes 
that the mind is able to perceive the sameness and difference 
of certain perceptions and sensations because these percep-
tions and sensations represent what the mind means ow same-
ness and difference.1 
But where does the mind acquire these meanings? Ac-
cording to Pei~ce, meanings are thirds which are real generals. 
Accordirg to James, the meanings of sameness and difference 
are ideas which the mind ...formulates because it is the nature 
of the mind to be able to discern sameness and difference, 
even though we do not know why or hovr the mind is able to do 
2 
so. Thus, some natural but inexplicable characteristic of 
the mind accounts for the discernment of sameness and differ-
ence and the consequent ability to formulate conceptions. 
This seems to be a weak position. · The unknown, the 
inexplicable, is no explanation, which James admits, 3 but he 
~esorts to an unknown feature of the mind in order to uphold 
his conceptualism. It is particularly strange that a psy-
chologist should support his metaphysical perspective with 
reference to a mental characteristic which he admits he does 
not understand. But be that as it may, James contends that 
when the mind compares its perceptions, it is somehow able 
1. Ibid., pp. 643-4. 2. Ibid., p. 643. . 3. Ibid. 
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to discern that some of these perceptions are similar and 
that some are different. From the ability to detect sameness, 
it is able to formulate other conceptio~s. 
James ~ays that conceptions are unchanging. Conception 
"results from our attention singling out some ·one part of the 
mass of matter for thought-which the world presents, and 
holding fast to it, without confusion. nl From the mass of 
sense-data the mind can isolate any quality or relation it 
pleases and consider it alone. Since attention is focused on 
only one aspect of the matter under consideration, concep-
tions are unchanging. The mind may alter its states and 
msanings and may ~ass from one conception to another, but one 
conception does not change into another. 2 
But ·J..a~:S·· does not explain how we can be certain that 
conceptions are unchanging. He defines conception as a func-
tion of a mental state and a mental state is instantaneo~s. 
Therefore, how can we know that the mental state of this 
present instant fulfills the same function, or bears any 
relation to a mental state of preceding instants? 3ames 1 
would say that the present mental state intends to fulfil~ 
the same function as that fulfilled by preceding mental 
states even if it does rot·, in fact, fulfill the same func-
tion. But again, he would have to rely on "mental structure" 
as the basis of the notion of sameness of intention. 
1. Ibid., I, p. 461. 2. Ibid., p. 462. 
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Conception is teleological. The mind concentrates .on 
whatever asp.ect of an object is important for its interests 
and neglects the rest. The abstracted property is the 
essence of the object as far as certain purposes are con-
darned. ''The essence of a thing is that pne of its proper-
ties which is so important for my interests that in compari-
son with it I may neglect the rest. nl As will be seen in 
section iv, interest is an emotion and emotion is a feeling. 
Thus, feeling determines what is considered the essence of 
something. Consequently there is no one essence of a thing. 
That which is the essential property of an object on one 
occasion may become very inessential on another. 2 The 
determination of essence by feeling accords with James's idea 
of reality, to be discussed in section iv. 
ii. Universals 
Conceptions may be individual or universal. 
An individual conception is of something 
restricted, in its application, to a single 
case. A universal or general conception ~s 
of an entire class, or of som~thing belonging 
to an entire class, of things. The conception 
of an abstract quality is, taken by itself, 
neither universal nor particular. If I 
abstract white • • • it is a perfectly defi-
nite .conception, but as I have not yet indi-
vidualized it •· •• it is so far nothing but 
a "that," a 11floating adjective." ••• B 
I 
James's account of the formation of universal concep-
tions reveals his theory of their referent. Thought is felt 
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to be continuous, but the objects of thought are discrete and 
discontinuous. Although we name a thought after its main 
object as if it knew that one thing and nothing else, ttl)That 
each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, with 
dimly perhaps a thousand other· things. nl For instanc.e, 
simultaneously with the main object of thought we also know 
our own bodily condition, however inattentively we may p.er-
ceive it. We have at least a vague perception of the object's 
relations, for "so surely as relations between objects exist 
in·rerum natura, so surely, and more surely, do feelings 
exist to which the·se relations are known. "2 Feelings of 
relation include at least a vague awareness of what went 
before an object of thought, what is expected to come after 
it, a sense of the direction from which an impression is 
about to come, a sense of absence, and such vaguely cognized 
relations as those verbally expressed by the words, "byJ, n 
11 and," "if," "but." 
Because feelings of relations mark the transition from 
the thought of one object to the thought of another, James 
labels them tttransitive parts" of the stream of thought. 3 
The "substantive parts" are those thoughts on which our 
attention is more apt to linger, as the thoughts of the object 
of discourse. Substantive parts of thought frequently include 
sensory images which can be held before the mind for an 
1. Ibid., p. 241. 2. ~., p. 245. 3. 1B!£., p. 243. 
• indefinite period of time and contemplated without changing. 
A transitive state is not a break in the continuity of 
thought. In fact, James maintains that relations and teelings 
of tendency form the major part of our objects of thought. 1 
Definite images constitute the smallest part and are sur~ 
rounded by a "halo" of their felt relations. 
Every definite image in the mind is steeped 
and dyed in the free water that flows round it. 
With it goes the.sense of its relations, near 
and remote, the dying echo of whence it came 
to us, the da'tming sense 'of whither it is to 
lead. The significance, the value, of the 
image is all in this halo or penumbra that 
surrounds and escorts it .••• 2 
Even conceptions, which attempt to concentrate exclusively on 
one aspect of the object, are surro~ded by this halo of 
relations. James also uses the terms, "psychic overtone," 
"suffusion,n and 11fringe 11 to designate the d~mly perceived 
relations and objects. surrounding the inain object of thought. 
The dim sense bf "something morett t.hat surrounds any 
substantive thought accounts for the presence and content of 
universal and abstract conceptions. The universality or 
particularity of a concept is imparted by the feeling of ~he 
thinker's intention. The application of a word to some or 
all of the members of its class is part of the psychic fringe 
surrounding it. 
When I use the word man in two different sen-
tences, I may have both times exactly the same 
1. ~., p. 255. 2. Ibid. 
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sound upon my lips and the same picture in my 
mental eye, but I may mean, and ••• know that 
I mean, two entirely different things. Thus 
when I say: 11What a wonderful man Jones is!" I 
am perfectly aware that I mean to exclude 
Napoleon Bonaparte or Smith. But when I say: 
"Wnat a wonderful thing Man is 1" I am equally 
well aware that I mean to include not only 
Jones, but Napoleon and Smith as well.l 
Thus the universality of the referent of a general term 
is designated by ·the felt intention of consciousness to refer 
to all members of the class represented by the term, This 
represents the conceptualist position that universal ideas 
are mental constructs referring to collections of particular 
objects. 
iii. Laws 
James holds the conceptualist belief that laws, neces-
sary truths, and the categories of number, resemblance, and 
difference are neither universal principles nor the result 
of sense experience; they are ways of perceiving things due 
. ,, 
to morphological processes which originally arose because of 
cerebral instability. Although first arising as random 
. 
behavior, those modes of perception which are applicable to 
experience are transmitted to later generations. Most scien-
tific hypotheses first arise as a spontaneous variation in 
someone's mind and are retained because they apply to experi-
ence.2 The elements of scientific, ethical, and aesthetic 
1. Ibid., p. 472. 2. ~., II, p. 636. 
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• systems are matters of experience, but the mind rearranges 
these elements into ideas which supervene upon experienc~e. 1 
They apply to experience but do not resemble it, for the. 
orderliness of these conceptual systems is incongruent with 
the disorderliness in the presentation or experience. 2 Only 
time and space relations are impressed by sensory experi-
ence.3 
Thus, unlike Peirce who says he believes that laws and 
universals are realities apart from the instances representing 
them and the minds apprehending, them, James believes they are 
realities only as mental constructions. Existence does not 
resist the application of these mental constructs, but these 
conceptions have no extra-mental reality. This is a con-
eeptualistic position. 
James's account of the derivation of conceptions 
reveals his theory of the.nature or reality, as will be 
developed in tbe subsequent explanation of sensation, per-
ception, and feeling. 
iv. Sensation, Perception, Feeling 
James believes that conceptions are derived only from 
4 
sensation and perception~ for conceptions arise from the 
mind's sense or sameness of the object perceived in two or 
1. ~., p. 639. 
3. ~., p. 632. 
2. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 6. 
more ~ortions of the mental stream. 
James defines sensation as 11 a function in our thought 
whereby we first become aware of the bare immediate natures 
by which our several objects are distinguished.nl "Sensa-
tions are first things in the way of consciousness. 112 In 
this sense James's sensation corresponds to Peirce's quali-
tative firstness. 
James relates sensation to physiological processes. 
Impressions from the external world stimulate the sensory 
nerves which convey the stimulation to the nervous centers 
in the brain. This excitement is discharged through the, 
efferent nerves to the m~scles and glands, thereby causing 
movements of the limbs and viscera as well as acts of 
secretion. 3 
"Pure sensations can only be realized in the earliest 
days of life;'4 for the adult cannot suppress the lll9mories and 
associations aroused by a sensation. The adult has sensations 
but they are qualified because the ·nerve-currents which pro-
duce sensations arouse associative and reproductive processes 
in the cortex due to the fact that the nerve currents have 
been previously traversed; the result is perception. Tha~ 
is, the sensation suggests other ideas, the first of which is 
"that of the thing to which the sensible quality belongs. 1!5 
1. Ibid., p. 3. 2. [lbid., p. 6. 3. Ibid., I, p. 12. 
4. Ibid., II, p. 7. 5. Ibid., p. 76. 
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•• The aggregate of actual and associated sensations constitutes 
the percept. Perception differs from sensation by the addi-
tion of further facts associated with the object of sensation. 
Perception always includes sensation, and in adult life 
sensation never occurs without perception. James's per-
eeptio n corresponds with Peirce's category of secondness~ 
which expresses reaction and association. 
The psychic fringe also is derived from sensation, for 
if each "idea" stand for some special nascent 
nerve-process, then the aggregate of these 
nascent processes mi?.ht have for its conscious 
correl~te a psychic 'fringe," which should be 
just that universal meaning, or intention, that 
the name or mental picture employed should mean 
all the possible individuals of the class. 1 
Peirce, on the other hand, contends that no collection 
of individuals, and therefore no collection of individual 
sensations, can adequately express a general conception, .for 
generals apply to all conceivable cases including those in 
an indefinite future. The psychic fringe surrounding an idea 
which is experienced at any one time could not represent 
future cases. 
Although James believes that conceptions arise from, 
sensation and that consciousness of some sort results from 
all incoming nerve currents, "it is only when new currents 
are entering that it has the sensational tang. "2 Only when 
consciousness experiences that "tang" does it encounter an 
1. Ibid., I, p. 477. 2. Ibid., II, P• 7. 
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external reality. Thus, only sensation encounters reality. 
Sensation, then, is cognitive. It is knowledge £! 
reality, whereas conception is knowledge about reality. The 
cognitive superiority of sensations and feelings over con-
cepts is due to the fact that conceptual thought abstracts 
its object from the flux of reality and holds it motionless 
and relationless before the mind for contemplation. But Chap-
ter III points out that every portion of reality has many 
relations. Therefore, although conceptual systems have c·on-
siderable theoretic value, they do not penetrate the "inner 
life" of the flux of reality. Only sensation and feeling can 
do this. 1 Thus, James says: 
O'onceptual systems which neither began nor 
left off in sensations would be like bridges 
without piers. Systems about fact must plunge 
themselves into sensation as bridges plunge 
their piers into the rock. Sensations are the 
stable rock, the terminus a quo and the 
terminus ad quem of thought.~o find such 
termini is-our aim with all our theories-- to 
conceive first when and where a certain sensa-
tion may be had, and then to have it • • • • 
Only when you deduce a possible sensation for 
me from your theory, and give it to me when 
and where the theory requires, do I begin to 
be sure that your thought has anything to do 
with truth. 2 
The cognitive superiority of conceptions over sensa-
tions, and therefore over perceptions is questionable in the 
light of James's classification of mental states. James 
refers to two broad types of mental states, namely feeling. 
1. James, APU, P• 250. 2. James, PSY II, p. 97. 
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-and thought. 1 flFeeling" is a generic term covering sensations 
and emotions. Sensations have been considered. Emotions are 
the feelings of bodily changes following certain perceptions 
t . 2 or sensa ~ons. That is, although common sense tells us that 
we lose our fortune, feel sorry, and then weep, 3 James con-
tends that this order of sequence is not correct. The bodily, 
or sensational, reaction to the stimulus must occur immedi-
ately after the stimulus, so that we lose our fortune, cry, 
and therefore are sorry. The stimulus produces certain 
bodily changes, such as tears, and the feeling of those 
bodily changes is the emotion. 4 Thus, emotions are sensa-
tiona of a particular kind. They are the internal sensations-
which follow, or are caused by, other sensations. 
"Thought" is a generic term referring to conception:~ 
and judgments. 5 Conception has been described above. James 
does not define "judgmentn but The Dictionary of Philosophy 
defines it as the affirming or denying a predicate of a 
subject. 6 
Since conceptions are derived from sensations, and 
since sensations are feelings, conceptual thought is derived 
from feeling. Further, as will be seen in section v, the 
1. Ibid., I, P• 222. 2. Ibid., II, p. 449. 
3. ~., pp. 449-50. 4. Ibid., p. 449. 
5. Ibid., I, P• 222. 
6. Charles A. Baylis, "Judgment," in Dagobert D. Runes, 
DOP, p. 157. 
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above definition of "judgment" corresponds to James's i¢1.ea of 
belief, which is feeling, not thought. Thus, .thought derives 
from feeling. Further, thoughts have fee~ings in that <I 
thinking feels in a particular way while the experience is 
occurring.1 In that sense, thoughts are feelings, although 
not al~ feelings are thoughts. Perhaps James had something 
like this in mind when he wrote-: "Feelings are the ger.m and 
starting point of cognition, thoughts the developed tr~e. n2 
Therefore, if sensation knows reality, why does con-
ception only know about reality? If conception is derived 
from a number of sensations, should it not know nore tqan 
sensation? James would answer that conception knows more 
about reality than does sensation b~cause·conceptions repre-. 
sent comparison and analysis of sensations. But conceptions 
are not the sum of the addition of sensations. Conception 
concentrates on one aspect of the reality sensed and neglects 
the rest. Only sensation has knowledge of reality because it 
.experiences reality when and as it occurs, an4 therefore 
experiences the relations which form a large part of reality. 
Perception also is knowledge about reality. 3 It is 
analogous to conception in that both represent knowledge 
about that which is not being experienced. .For instance, if 
I see a table, sensation merely presents certain visual 
1. James, PSY I, pp. 478-9 n. 
3. Ibid., II, p. 2. 
2. ~., p. 222. 
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phenomena. It does not present the name, 11 table." It is 'mt 
a memory of other tables. In itself the sensation does not 
inform me of the use of the table or of the fact that the 
phenomenon represents an outward object. But if I consider 
the visual sensation to represent an external thing, and if I 
give that thing a name, then the sensation has aroused other 
ideas and has become associated with_other sensations, both 
past and present. The experience is then a perception. Per-
caption is the associ.ation of sensations and the ideas s.ug-
gested by sensation~ It adds various mental processes to 
' . . 
sensation. 
Conception also represents a mental operation on the 
data supplied by sensation, for it analyzes and compares sen-
sations and perceptions and concentrates on certain aspects. 
In fact 1 mental states 'may be represented in terms of Rsets. n 
Sensations, the "first things in the way of consciousness"1 
are "pure feeling." A perception is the association of re-
lated sensations and therefore may be considered as a tt~etn 
consisting of sensations and ideas of sensations. Conception 
results from the comparison of perceptions·, that is, from the 
comparison of different !'setsn of sensations. In attacJ;l.ing 
the idea of 11 the same 1• to various sets of sensations, con-
ceptual thought unites these sets into a larger set. Thus, 
in a sense, conceptions are larger "sets" of sensations, or 
1. Ibid., p. 6. 
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feelings. Conceptions form one end of a continuum of feeling, 
o£ which the opposite end is sensation. 
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Now, conception cannot achieve knowledge of reality 
because it excludes reality's relations, and perception cannot 
have knowledge of reality because the memories and ideas which 
it associates with sensations may be erroneous. Therefore, 
we can never have an unmodified knowledge of reality after the 
first few days of life, for as soon as a normal human being 
has lived long enough to acquire memories, he cannot suppress 
those memories and associations which are aroused by a sensa-
tion. Thus, the newborn infant has a less qualified knowledge 
£[ reality than the educated adult, although the adult knows 
more about reality. The adult has experienced more sensations 
than the infant, but the adult's sensations are all qualified. 
The succeeding section of this chapter, as well as large por-
tions of Chapter III,presenmevidence that James consid~r~ 
unqualified fe~ling, knowledge 2[ reality, to be more valid 
than knowledge about reality. If so, the innocent babe must 
possess greater insight into the "inner fluxu than the adult 
who is burdened with conceptual systems and perceptual 
associations. 
Thus, thought derives from feeling and all thoughts are 
feelings, although not all feelings ar·e what James calls 
thoughts. He restricts this appellation to conceptions., and 
judgments. However, James says that all feelings are 
• cognitive. "The lowest mental fact as well as the highest 
may grasp some bit of truth as its content • • ul This • • 
accords with his statements that sensation or feeling, en-
counters reality and therefore knows reality. 
v. Reality 
James maintains that not only does feeling know reality; 
for common sense it is reality. He develops this viewpoint 
in his notion of belief. There is a vast difference between 
imagining a thing and believing in its existence. In the 
case of belief, the object is not merely thought of but is 
said to have reality. Thus, belief is defined as "the mental 
state or function of cognizing reality. 112 Subjectively, 
'· 
belief is a feeling of certainty, assurance. Everything 
which comes before the mind is believed unless it is contra-
dieted by something else which comes before the mind. 11Any 
object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed 
and posited as absolute reality."3 Since thought is derived 
orily from feeling experienced at some time, 4 any feelings 
which are uncontradicted by others are posited as realiyy. 
When two thoughts contradict each other, consciousness must 
choose which one to believe and therefore to posit as the 
real. 
1. Ibid., p. 478 n. 
3. Ibid., p. 289. 
2. Ibid., p. 283. 
4. Ibid., p. 487. 
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The subjects adhered to [believed in] become 
real subjects, the attributes adhered to real 
attributes, the existence adhered to real 
existence; whilst the subjects disregarded 
become imaginary subjects, the attributes 
disregarded erroneous attributes, and the 
existence disregarded an existence in no 
man's land, in the limbo, "where footless 
fancies dwell."l 
Although the discarded entities are habitually disre-
garded, James says they do have reality within their own 
world. "As objects of fancy, ~ errors, !!! occupants of· 
dreamland, etc., they are • • • indefeaa'ible parts of lii'e, 
• • • undeniable features of the Universe •• • • Ever.y-
thing that comes before the mind is assigned to at least one 
of several worlds, each one having ita own reality. For 
~ 
instance, there is the world of myth, the world of dreams, 
the world of science, the world of abstract truths, the 
various supernatural worlds. Each world is true in ita own 
way while the mind attends to it. All experiences are real 
and experience is reality. For James, pure experience is 
"another name for feeling or aensation." 3 Perceptions and 
conceptions are experiences but they are derived from 
sensation, or feeling. 
But some worlds contradict each other. For instance, 
the world of dreams often contradicts the world of scie.nce. 
Are some worlds "more realu than others? James's answer is 
1. Ibid., pp. 290-1. 2. Ibid., p. 291. 
3. James, APU, Appendix A, p. 348. 
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that each person has dominant habits of attention and these 
select what is for him the world of ultimate reality. What-
ever contradicts this world's objects is posited in another 
world which is not as real as the ultimate world. The world 
of ultimate reality is that which appears to be most inter-
eating and important. Interest and a sense of importance are 
emotions.. Emotions are the feelings of bodily changes which 
immediately follow perception of the exciting fact. 1 Thus 
feelings determine which sensations are, for us, the real. 
In the relative sense, • • • reality means 
simply relation to our emotional and active 
life. This is the only sense which the word 
ever has in the mouths of practical men.2 
Thus, reality is subjective. The criterion of reality 
is belief. Anything perceived is in some way real. The most 
interesting and important perceptions are believed to be the 
most real. Interest and sense of importance are emotions. 
Emotions are feelings. Therefore, feeling determines what is 
most real. Since sensations are more compelling than concep-
tions, the latter must either show sensible effects or be 
disbelieved. Further, more vivid sensations are more inter-
eating and therefore more belief-compelling than less vivid. 
But James objects to this notion of reality as subjec-
tive and frequently tries to refute this interpretation. In 
The Meaning of Truth he says "That reality is 'independent' 
1. Jrunes, PSY II, p. 449. 2. Ibid., p. 295. 
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means that there is something in every experience that e~capes 
our arbitrary control."1 In Pragmatism he says, "facts come 
independently and determine our beliefs provisionally."2 
~ Again in Pragmatism he defends himself against the charge of 
subjectivity by saying: 
A favorite forrr.ula for describing Mr. Schiller's 
doctrines and mine is that we are persons who 
think that by saying whatever you find it 
pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil)~. 
every pragmatistic requirement·. 
I leave it to you to judge whether this be 
not an impudent slander • • • • the pragmatist 
• ; • feels the immense pressure of objective 
control under which our minds perform their 
operations. 3 
Thus, there is still a question as to the nature of 
that which causes the sensations and feeling. Presumably the 
independent reality is what it is regardless of the way in 
which it is perceived. 
James considers this in his discussion of activity. 
Our experience of activity consists in certain sensations and 
feelings, for example, the will to s~and a strain. But, he 
asks, 
Does our feeling do more than record the fact 
that the strain is sustained? The real activity, 
meanwhile, is the doing of the fact; and what is 
the doing made of before the record is made? 
• • • the activity felt is only its superficial 
sign. 4 ----
1. James, MOT, p. 69. 2. James, PRAG, p. 147. 
3. Ibid., p. 151. 4. James, APU, Appendix B, p. '381. 
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Experienced activity is an impression. What is the cause o~ 
that impression? James answers by first equating activity 
with causation, since real activity makes things be. 1 Then 
he states that i~ there is a cause of ~elt activity, it :must 
be immediately lived somewhere. 
Somewhere the that o~ e~~icacious causing and 
the what o~ it must be experienced in one, just 
as the what and the that of 11 cold11 are experi-
enced in one whenever a man has the sensation 
o~ cold here and now •••• to see the ther-
mometer contradict us when we say nit is cold" 
does not abolish cold as a specific nature 
from the uni~erse. Cold is in the arctic circle 
if not here. 
Similarly, wherever the origin of real causality is, it 
is of the same nature as that which we experience. 
Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with 
effort as we g9, hanging on, and finally 
achieving our intention--this is action, this . 
is effectuation in the only shape in which, by 
a-pure experience-philosophy, the whereabouts 
of it anywhere can be discussed •••• To treat 
this offhand as the bare illusory surface of a. 
world whose real causality is an unimaginable 
ontological principle hidden in the cubic deeps, 
is, for the more empirical way of thinking, only 
animism in another shape.3 
Activity is just what we feel it to be. Further, if we could 
know what activity is transcendentally, the knowledge would 
be of use only in helping us to recognize activity as experi-
enced. Presumably James would consider the reality of all 
other experiences to be just as we experience them, namely, 
as sensations or feeling. Despite his professed belief in 
1. Ibid., p. 389. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., pp. 390-1. 
5 7 
0 
0 
objective reality, feeling is reality and reality is sub-
jective. 
The subjectivity of reality is affirmed in The Varieties 
of Religious Experience in which James distinguishes two 
aspects of experience, one objective and one subjective. The 
objective part is the sum total of what we are thinking. The 
subjective part is "the inner 'state' in which the thinking 
comes to p·ass .• nl Presumably this "inner state" consists in 
the feelings surrounding the conception. The objective 
content of the experience may be of great significance, for 
instance the cosmic times and spaces. 
. 
• 
Yet the cosmtc objects, so far as the experi-
ence yields them, are but ideal pictures of 
something whose existence we do not inwardly 
possess but only point at outwardly, while the 
inner state is our very experience itself; its 
reality and that of our experience are one. A 
conscious field plus its object as felt or 
thought of plus an attitude towards the object 
plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude 
belongs--such a concrete bit of personal ex-
perience • • • • is a full fact, even though 
it be an insignificant fact; it is of the kind 
to which all r~alities whatsoever must ----
belong •••• 
In answer to the charge that this is an egotistic view of 
reality, James replies, ttthe axis of reality runs solely 
through the egotistic places n3 Again, he says, • • • • 
the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder 
strata of character, are the only places in 
1. James, VRE, p. 447. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., p. 448. 
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the world in which we catch real fact in the 
making, and directly perceive how events 
happen, and how work is actually done.l 
That is, personal experience, which is feeling, is the only 
reality we know. It is reality for us, and the cause of this 
experience is of the same nature of our experience. Despite 
his protests, James t.s reality is subjective. 
vi. Consciousness 
In 1904 James propounded the doctrine that experience 
and experiencing, feeling and the object of feeling, are the 
2 
same fact of being. In "Does Consciousness Exist?" he 
reiterates that "the one primal stuff or material in th~ 
world" 3 is pure experience, which means sense or. feeling 
experience. 
Consciousness is not an existent but it is, "a particu-
lar sort of relation toward one another into which portions 
of pure experience may enter. " 4 The relation is a cognitive 
one. "One of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of 
the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object 
known." 5 Thus, consciousness is a relation which is "a func-
tion in experience which thoughts perform, • • • • That 
6 function is knowing." 
Now, as discussed above, all experience reduces tb 
1. Ibid., p. 449. 
3. Ibid • , p • 4. 
5. Ibid. 
2. ·James, ERE, pp. 1-58.' 
4. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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feeling; all thoughts are derived from feeling, and feeling 
is cognitive. Thus, consciousness is a relation between two 
terms, one of which represents the feeling agent; the other 
is the object of feeling. Since that which we feel is what 
we feel it to be, the object of feeling is feeling. Sin.ce 
the feeling agent is one of the terms of tbe experience rela-
tion and since all experience is feeling, the feeling agent 
also is feeling. Therefore consciousness is a relation of 
wbicb both terms are feelings. Further, the relation it'self 
is feeling, for it is "a part of pure experience. nl Else-
2 
where James very explicitly says that relations are feelings. 
Therefore, consciousness is a feeling with two terms, bo'tb 
of which are feelings. 
James concludes that ltexperience, • • • bas no • • • 
inner duplicity. 113 The same experience., which is feeling, 
can be considered as either the feeling consciousness or as 
the object of feeling, both of which are feelings. Therefore, 
for common sense, "the thought stuff and the thing stuff are 
• • • the same. 114 That one reality ia feeling. That this 
reality is of a different nature than at first appears is 
explained in Chapter III. 
If James means that experience bas no inner dupliyity 
because all experience is the same kind of reality, then tbe 
1. ~., p. 4. 
3. James, ERE, p. 9. 
2. James, PSY II, p. 149. 
4. James, MOT, p. 47. 
6 0 
• 
--
above argument is consistent with his contention that all 
reality is feeling. However~ if he means that an experience 
unit has no formal duplicity, then his contention is question-
able. His definition of consciousness as a relation which 
"portions of experience may enter, 111 implies formal duality, 
or even plurality; it is inconsistent with his conclusion 
that consciousness and its content form an ttundivided portion 
of experience."2 He defines relation as a feeling but it must 
be a feeling of duality or plurality. For instance, the 
I 
feeling of direction involves the feeling of a ~'place to," and 
a "place from. 11 According to his conceptualism~ the relation 
of similarity is meaningless apart from the notion of at, 
least two realities~ actual or ideal, which are the terms 
of the relation. 
James upholds the unity of the experience relation by 
saying that experiencing and the object of experience are 
different aspects of one fact. 
A given undivided portion of experience, taken 
in.one context of associates, play[s] the part 
of a knower, of a state of mind, of "conscious-
ness"; while in a different context the same 
undivided bit of experience plays the part of 
a thing known, of an objective "content. n3 
These two aspects of the experience are two ways of 
considering the experience. But the two different ways of 
considering the experience are two different feelings. 
1. James, ERE, p. 4. 2. Ibid., p. 9. 
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Consideration of a mental fact as an experiencing consci·ous-
ness is a different feeling £rom the consideration of the 
aame mental fact as an object of experience. James probably 
would agree with this, but he would say that consideration of 
the relation as ·a relation between two terms is a·feeling in 
itself. It is different from the feeling of either of its 
terms. That is, the feeling of A differs from the feeling of 
B, and the feeling of A also differs from the feeling of A in 
relation to B. Further, the feeling of term A in its relation 
to term B differs from the feeling of term B in its relation 
to term A. Both di~fer from the feeling of the relation R 
which has two terms, A and B, but which is a single feeling 
in itself and as such is undivided. 
It is true that the feeling of the relation is a single 
feeling; since the relation is a feeling, the feeling of the 
relation is the feeling of a feeling. But the duality is not 
in this feeling of the feeling. It is in the relation itself 
which involves at least two terms. In the case of experience 
the two terms are the experiencing agent and the object of 
experience. Both of these are feelings, but in the experience 
~ 
rel~tion they are two different feelings. However they may 
be related, they are two different terms within the relation-
ship. Therefore, exception must be taken to James's con-
tent.ion that the experience relation involves no duality. 
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• 5. Peirce's Criticism of James's Reality 
I~ Peirce's terminol9gy this reduction of reality to 
feeling amounts to a reduction of all reality to firstness. 
Peirce maintains that the three modes of being are irreduci-
ble. Secondness requires firstness for its actualization, 
and thirdness· requires firstness and secondness to be oper-
ative (5.436), but each mode of being is something other than 
the ones preceding it. He demonstrates this in several ways. 
That secondness cannot be reduced to firstness is 
illustrated by the distinction between perception and experi-
, 
ence. Peirce's percepts are equivalent to James's pure 
sensations. That is, they are first things in consciousness. 
Although James's experience is a relation with two terms, 
Peirce's experience involves otherness and is secondness. 
Peirce says that we perceive objects, but we must experience 
events, which are changes of perception. We cannot perceive 
events. For example, if a whistling locomotive lowers the 
tone of its whistle, we can perceive the higher note and the 
lower note but not the change of note (1.336). The change 
we can only experience. Experience, or change of perception, 
is characterized by shock, which implies resistance, for "the 
long whistle of the locomotive, ••• has set up in me a 
certain inertia •••• " (1.336) Resistance is a chara.cteris-
tic of secondness. Thus, experience of events represents 
secondness and is not equivalent to perception or firstness. 
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Thi~dness·is_irreducible because it is of the nature .of 
thought, and thoughts are neither qualities (firstness) nor 
facts (secondness). They are not qualities because thoughts 
can be produced and grow, whereas qualities are as they are 
without relation to anything else and consequently are change-
less and eternal. Thoughts often have reasons, and ttto ask 
why a quality is as it is, why red is red and not green, 
would be lunacy:." (1, 420) Thoughts are not facts because 
there is much -in existent·ial fact that is not reasonable,1• 
If, while you are walking in the street ••• 
a man carrying a heavy pole suddenly pokes you 
in the small of the back, you may think there 
is something in the Universe that Pure Reason 
fails to account for •••• (5.92) 
Thus, thirdness is not reducible to secondness or firstness. 
The logic of relatives diagrams the irreducibilitY' of 
the categories, which are represented by three, kinds of 
logical characters {1.363). Singular characters are predi-
cable of single qualities, such as whiteness and la.rgene,ss. 
I 
Dual characters apply to pairs of objects and consist of 
relative terms such as "lover,tt ttsimilar,n "other." These 
~arms have two correlates, subject and object. Triple charac-
ters are relatives which require three correlates. For ,. 
instance, in building a sentence around the word "giving" it 
is necessary to introduce three terms, as in A gives B to C. 
No dual relation between any two of these terms expresses the 
meaning of the triple relation. Plural relations involv.,ing 
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more than three characters can all be reduced to triple 
relations (1.371), but triple relations cannot be reduce~ 
to dual relations and neither can be expressed by singular 
characters. 
In thus illustrating the irreducibility of the cate-
gories, Peirce refutes James's contention that al~ reality 
reduces to feeling. However, Chapter III discusses Peirce's 
contention that all reality is of the nature of thought, or 
thirdness. Within this mode of being, thoughts are in rela-
tion toeach other as first, second, and third. Thus, Peirce 
also postulates one ultimate mode of being • 
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CHAPTER III 
CONTINUITY 
The preceding chapter discusses the theories of 
-reality of Peirce and James. The present chapter 
presents their respective views that reality, as they 
conceive it, is continuous. Each philosopher begins by 
establishing the continuity of personal consciousness. 
Each then applies continuity to all of reality and then 
develops the notion of its continuity into a metaphystcal 
system. 
As Peirce and James have widely different ideas of 
reality, it is to be expected that they formulate differ-
ent conceptions of its continuity and diverge even further 
in their metaphysical systems. Their differences corre-
late with their respective positions regarding realism 
and conceptualism. 
This chapter briefly discusses and compares the two 
philosophers' ideas of continuity and of consciousnes~. 
Then, at some length, it discusses and compares their 
doctrines of the continuity of consciousness and shows 
how each writer developed his doctrine metaphysically~ 
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1. Peirce's Definitions of Continuity 
Peirce formulated several definitions of continui t,Y, 
most of which are related to mathematics. This chapter will 
consider only those nonmathematical aspects of continuity 
which pertain to the continuity of consciousness and to 'the 
metaphysical development of this doctrine. 
In 1892, when he wrote his nnst important wo~k about 
the continuity of consciousness, Peirce stated that one 
feature of a continuum is "Kanticity," so named because it 
expresses Kant's idea that between any two members of a con-
tinuous series, na third can always be found. n (6 .120) !At 
that time Peirce interpreted Kanticity as infinite divisi-
bility, but he later interpreted Kanticity to mean that "a 
continuum is that of which every part has its parts of t')J.e 
same kind." (1.168) 1 In so far as something is continuous, 
"the same thing is true of every portion of it; while in the 
sense in which it is irregular its continuity is broken. u 
(7.535) Thus, in addition to having a part between any ~wo 
' parts, a continuum must have homogeneous parts. Thus, 
Kanticity is not infinite divisibility, for although "that 
all of whose parts have parts of the same kindn -:b& infinitely 
divisible, that which is infinitely divisible is not neces-
sarily divisible into homogeneous parts. 
1. Date uncertain. However, in the Collected Papers this 
section appears with and sensibly follows paragraphs 
written in 1903. See note to CP 6.164 and Buchler, CPE, 
Appendix II, p. 269. 
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Peirce also says that nKant 1 s real definition implies 
that a continuous line contains no points." (6.168) This 
appears to contradict the above definition but the apparent 
contradiction is resolved in terms o~ Peirce's three modes of 
reality. He says that a place does not exist as secondness 
until something marks it (6.168). But when it is marked, it 
loses its continuity because the mark distinguishes the 
existent from all other realities and in that sense renders 
it discontinuous. Therefore, a true continuum has no parts. 
That is, true continuity does not exist as secondness; it is 
a real possibility, which is firstness. However, Kant's 
definition of a continuum as "that all of whose parts have 
parts of the same kir:d n expresses the common-sense idea of 
continuity as it is applied to existents. 
Continuity as thirdness is implied in his statement that 
"continuity is the relation of the parts of an unbroken space 
or time." t6.168) Thirdness is invoked by the word "rel~tion11 
which indicates that the mode of connection of the parts must 
be part of the continuum. That is, an unbroken space or time 
cannot have parts. But when, for practical purposes in the 
world of existence it is broken into parts, common sense 
regards it as continuous if each of the parts has parts of 
the same kind. But if all the parts of the continuum arC;:l of 
the same kind, ~d the relation of the parts is part of the 
continuum, then the relation of the parts must be of the same 
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quality as the parts. If so, it is impossible to distinguish 
the parts from their mode of connection. Chapter II notes 
that since existents always exist in relation-to an other, 
the essential feature of their existence is their relatedness. 
For this reason, too, the parts as existents cannot be dis-
tinguished apart from their relation. Thus, the continuum 
is not really divided into parts. Such unbrokenness is ,1 of 
course, the essential feature of a continuum. But continuity 
cannot exist as secondness because the mode-of-existence 
distinguishes the existent from all other.realitie~ and in 
that sense renders it discontinuous. 
Therefore, continuity is not existence but is possi-
bility (firstne~s) and ~elation (thirdness). That continuity 
as thirdness evolves from continuity as firstness, or possi-
bility, is explained in section 5i where continuity is 
revealed as an essential feature of Peirce's cosmogony. 
Peirce also describes continuity as "fluidity, the 
merging of part into part. n (1.164) This definition is .much 
like James's 1890definition, discussed below. 
2. James's Definitions of Continuity 
In The Principles of Psychology of 1890 James def~nes 
the continuous as ~tthat which is without break, crack, or 
division."1 Later, in a work published posthumously but 
1. James, PSY I, p. 237. 
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written during 1909 and 1910, he says that continuity i:s 
"inseparably bound up" with infinite divisibility.1 Bec·ause 
this contradicts perceptual experience, he formulates a 
theory which presents reality as discontinuous according ~o 
the criterion of infinite divisibility, and enunciates a new 
definition of continuity which corresponds with the 11fe]t 
continuity" of conscious experience. 
James begins by illustrating that although infinite 
divisib~lity is a concept imposed on experienqe, it does not 
represent the reality of experience. For instance, if time 
is infinitely divisible, a period of twenty seconds can never 
elapse, for before the later half of the interval can elapse 
the first half must elapse, and before this time can pass 
2 the first quarter must do so. This paradox, a form of 
Zeno's arguments against time and motion, proves that if 
time and motion are infinitely divisible, time cannot pass 
and motion cannot occur. 3 Therefore, they are not real. 
However, Chapter II explains James's contention that 
the cause of experience is of the same nature as experience 
and that sensible experience is reality for us. ~ow, James 
says that we do sensibly experience both time and motion. We 
age with the passage of time, and we feel ourselves and the 
objects of our experience to be constantly moving. These 
1. James, SPOP, p. 156. 
3. James, SPOP, p. 157. 
2. James, APU, p. 229. 
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experiences are real, and the causes of such experiences are 
realities which are of the same nature as our experiences. 
Therefore, both time and motion are real. 
Further, our sensible experience does not present 
motion and change in infinitesimal points., 
If a bottle had to be emptied by an infinite 
number of successive decrements, it is mathe-
matically impossible that the emptying should 
ever positively terminate. In point of fact, 
however, bottles and coffee-pots empty them-
selves by a finite number of decrements, each 
of definite amount. Either a whole drop 
emerges or nothing emerges from the spout.l 
For James the only way to avoid Zenonian paradoxes is 
to believe our perceptual experiences of a reality which 
changes by finite, discrete steps. 2 The discontinuity theory 
of reality asserts that experience changes in finite, sensi-
ble amounts or it remains unchanged. The infinity that we 
attribute to experience is imposed by our later conceptual 
act of indefinitely dividing it by any given amount. Experi-
ence does not resist conceptual treatment, but the concepts 
do not represent the way in which experience occurs. Thus, 
James's experiential reality does not present infinite divisi-
bility or any form of Kanticity, since this principle repre-
sents a conceptual division performed after experience has 
occurred. This concept can be applied to reality after the 
immediately given feelings or sensations, but it does not 
1. James, APU, p. 231. 2. James, SPOP, p. 187. 
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represent the reality of feeling or sensation. 
Despite his declaration that experience is discontinu-
ous if continuity is conceived as infinite divisibility, 
James neither posits continuity as a non-reality nor, like 
Peirce, as possibility and relation. Since Peirce proposes 
three modes of being, his continuity need not conform to ex-
perience, for experience, when considered as signifying 
something other, represents the world of existence. But 
since James's reality reduces to feeling experience, he 
formulates an empirical definition of continuity which 
states that "anything is continuous when its parts app~ar as 
immediate next neighbors, with absolutely nothing between. nl 
Now, infinite divisibility might apply to such a continuum. 
Further, Kanticity as having a point between any two points 
also might apply to this continuum. But James's definition 
of continuity differs from those which specify either infinite 
divisibility or any form of Karticity precisely because it 
does not specify these criteria. That is, infinite divisi-
bility and Kanticity are not experi~nced in the perceptual 
flux. Rather, personal experience does feel as though it is 
without break. Since reality is of the nature of experience, 
personal experience is a premise to any inferential conclusion. 
Thus, in defintng continuity James omits those elements which 
are not experienced, even though the experienced pehnomena do 
1. ~., p. 187. 
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not resist the later application of these ideas. 
The mention of "parts" in the second definition is 
problematical. Granted that infinite divi~ibility is never . 
experienced, simple division is experienced. We can directly 
experience several objects as being distinct and we can 
apprehend one object being divided into several parts. There-
fore, isn't' the notion of parts a violation of continuity? 
James would say it is not, because experience and that which 
is experienced are the same kind of reality. Hence, conti-
nuity as it is experienced in consciousness is of the nature 
of co,ntinuity per ~· T'he experience of reality changefl by 
finite, perceptual amounts; reality is presented in finite, 
sensible parts. Therefore, continuity has parts and these 
are mentioned in its definitions. But if reality has parts, 
if it is not experienced as continuous, why doesn't James say 
that reality is not continuous and that there is no conti-
nuity? Why create a continuity with parts just to conform to 
the discontinuity of the objects of experience? 
James would say that this question confuses the objects 
of experience and the process of experiencing. In The Princi-
ples of Psychology he stresses that the ob~cts of expe~ience 
are discontinuous but that experiencing is continuous. 1 
Experiencing includes apprehension of objects, of the gaps 
between objects, and of the relations between objects. There 
1,. James, PSY I, p. 240. 
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is "nothing~• between the parts of experience because the' 
feeling of nothingness is itself part of experience. Experi-
encing is continuous~ event hough the things which are 
experienced are .discontinuous. 
However, this position implies a duality in the experi-
ence relation. Chapter II discusses .James 1 s insistence ~that 
there is no duplicity in experience; experiencing and that 
which is experienced form a relation which .James says presents 
an inner unity. But if experiencing is continuous~ whereas 
the objects of experience are discontinuous~ then the process 
of experiencing is a differently expe~ienced reality from 
that. which is experienced. .James would counter that nthat 
which is experiencedn is :Ueeling~ sensation~ and perception. 
~eeling and the awareness of feeling constitute the experience 
relation which is continuous. That which is discontinuous is 
the extra-mental real~ty which causes the feeling. But~ as 
,, 
discussed in Chapter II~ .James contends that whatever causes 
experience is of the same nature as experience~ namely~ 
feeling. Therefore~ if the objects of experience are di-s-
continuous~ then either the experiencing process is discon-
tinuous or there is a duplicity within the experience rela-
tion. If personal experience is continuous~ that which is 
experienced is not the same fact as the process of experi-
encing consid~red from another point of view. The experience 
relation has two different terms~ even though both terms are 
the same kind of reality. 
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It could be objected that within the category of 
feeling, there are many different kinds of feelings. For 
instance, a visual sersation differs from an auditory one, 
a vague feeling differs from a chain of inference. The re-
duction of all reality to one mode does not do away with 
varying qualities which divide experience into parts and 
interrupt the continuity. Therefore, James has no right-to 
redefine continuity so that it applies· to discontinuity •. But 
James would reply that experience is reality and therefore 
the only kind of continuity that is real for us· is the conti-
nuity we experience. It is senseless to talk of a continuity 
which we can never experience. Rather than say that there 
is no continuity because different feelings and perception·s 
mark the parts of experience, James ·redefines continuity to 
conform to the experience relation of different perceptions 
and feelings. Since. experiences "run into one another and seem 
to interpenetrate, nl he redefines a continuum as one whose 
parts are immediately next to each other. There is nottiing 
between the parts because even the feeling of nothingness is 
a part of experience. 
James's second definition of continuity, which recog-
nizes parts, differs from the first definition which spe·ci-
fies lack of parts and lack of division. The first definition 
is the one James had in mind 'in formulating the doctrine of 
1. James, APU, p. 282. 
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the continui~y of consciousness. This doctrine states that 
"consciousness • • • does not appear to itself chopped up in 
bits."1 It does not account for the variety of experiences 
within the conscious stream. This may be why James did not 
then conceive of a continuum with parts or include experi-
enced parts in the definition of continuity. 
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To summarize so far: when.formulating their respective 
doctrines of the continuity of consciousness, James conceived 
of continuity as that which is experienced in consciousness, 
and Peirce conceived it as a real~ty which is applicable to 
experience but which has being outside of experience. Their 
definitions accord with their'ideas of reality, for James 
considers experience to be reality whereas Peirce recognizes 
reality which is not experienced. 
) 
3. ·consciousness : Peirce and James 
While a detailed comparison of consciousness as con7 
ceived by Peirce and James is beyond the scope of this theses, 
a brief consideration of each writer's understanding of con-
sciousness is in order before comparing their respective 
. I 
views on its continuity. 
Chapter II notes James's conception of consciousness as 
one aspect of the experience relation. Experience for him 
means perception, sensation, and feeling. Consciousness is 
1. James, PSY I, p. 239. 
perceiving, sensing, feeling; its "content•t is that which is 
perceived, sensed, and felt. Consciousness and its content 
are two terms. of a relation. Peirce similarly expresses the 
functional nature of consciousness. He criticizes the "in-
cautious assumption that it is one thing to look red or green 
and another thing to see red or green." (7.561) He says that 
consqiousness is :t:l'Ot an idle spectator 11on one side of the 
footlights, and the world on the other" (7.562), and thus 
sfl,ares James's view· that consci.o.usness and its content are 
two sides of one relation. The same objections apply to 
Peirce's view of the inner unity of this relation as apply to 
James's theory. These are discussed in Chapter II. 
For James all conscious experience is reducible to· one 
mode of being. That is, Chapter II discusses James's con-
tention that all experience ultimately is sense or feeling 
experience. Perceptions and conceptions are experiences but, 
as discussed in Chapter II, they are derived from sense and 
feeling. Perceptions are associations of sensations. Concep~ 
tions concentrate on one aspect of sense experience to the 
exclusion of all others. Emotions, which are feelings, deter-
mine what aspect is to be the object of concentration. 
Further, in the case of conflicting perc.eptual ·and conceptual 
systems feeling determines which ones are to be considered 
truly representative of reality. In addition, the experience 
of a perception or conception is a feeling. Therefore, for 
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James all conscious experiences are aspects of one reality, 
which is feeling. 
Peirce, on the other hand, distinguishes three modes of 
consciousness and they represent three modes of being. 
11Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness 
taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else." 
(7.551} It represents firstness. Altersense is the 
consciousness of an other. It is secondness and is experi-
enced as sensation and will. Medisense is "consciousness of 
a process of bringing to mind. tt ( 7. 551) That is, it is the 
knowledge "through some third idea or process different from 
either the Knowing self or the Known object." (7.544} It is 
thirdness and is known as abstraction, ·suggestion, and 
association. As is expressed in Chapter II, Peirce insists 
that the three modes of being are irreducible. Thus, while 
Peirce and James agree that consciousness and its content 
form one relation, James believes that relation to be within 
one mode of being whereas Peirce says the relation has three 
modes which r,epresent three irreducible modes of reality. 
However, section 5 discussed Peirce's metaphysical 
position that all reality is of. the nature of thought. There-
f·ore, the three modes of being are ultimately the same kind 
of reality, but within this one mode of being thoughts are 
related to each other as first, second, and third. Thus for 
Peirce also, the relation of consciousness and its content 
ultimately represents one mode of being. 
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• 4. Continuity and Consciousness 
Continuity plays the central role in the metaphysiqal 
systems of Peirce and James. Both philosophers establish its 
reality by demonstrating that we directly experience conti-
nuity in personal consciousness. 
i. Peirce's Theories 
Peirce formulated the continuity of consciousness in 
several ways, two of which will be discussed. Each formula-
tion of his theory begins by asking how a past idea can be in 
present consciousness. If an idea is considered an event in 
an individual consciousness, then an idea once past is gdne. 
A memory of a past idea is a new idea and cannot be compared 
with the past idea inpre~ent consciousness. But we must 
somehow know a past idea, for otherwise disc·ursi ve knowledge 
would be impossible. Peirce concludes that a past idea must 
somehow be present to the consciousness. The problem is how 
this is possible. 
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A work of 18731 presents an explanation which is directly 
related to his concept of a continuum as that which has parts 
all of whose parts are of the same kind. This statement says 
that a past thought can be present because every thought nis 
made up of more special thoughts which in their turn are them-
selves made up by others and so on indefinitely." (7.351) 
1. See note, CPa 7.346-353. 
The entire. thought of a person's lifetime is a continuum, all 
of whose parts are alike as required by his definition of 
continuity. 
This statement presents several problems. There are 
many different kinds of thoughts: fleeting fancies, thoughts 
of sensory data, great chains of inference. To be consistent, 
Peirce would not reduce these to the same mode of thought for 
in Peirce's usage perception is firstness, sensation of 
another is secondness, and inference from .two premises to' a 
cornlusion is thirdness. On this account, the continuity of 
thought does not correspond with his concept of continuity 
as involving homogeneity of parts, for the parts of the 
totality of thought are not the same kinds of thought. This 
is the same objection that could be applied to James's con-
ception of a continuum as havirg parts. 
Peirce would counter that thoughts of fleeting fancies, 
thoughts of sensory date, and thoughts of inference are 
thoughts and therefore thirdness. Within the category of 
thought there are thoughts of firstness, secondness, and 
thirdness. In respect to one another some thoughts are first, 
second, and third, but all thought is one mode of being and 
therefore is continuous. 
A statement of 1892 (6.10'7-6.111) presents the conti,-
nuity of thought in a demonstration comparable to that of 
James. According to this later demonstration, a past thought 
is present to consciousness because consciousness embraces an 
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interval of time. However, this interval cannot be finite, 
for if consciousness is immediately aware of a sensation 1 
preceding the present by a half second, then by the same 
principle the awareness of that sensation must include an 
immediate awareness of the sensation which preceded it by a 
half second, ad infinitum. Hence, consciousness would be 
immediately aware of all sensations which it had known at· any 
preceding finite interval of time. But, since the ideas of a 
year ago clearly are not immediately present to conscious-
ness, "it follows that this is true of any finite interval, 
however short." (6.110) 
If consciousness cannot cover a finite interval of time, 
then Peirce says it must cover an infinitesimal period of time, 
for he declares that a mode of reasoning which applies to the 
finite does not apply to the infinitesimal. He demonstrates 
this as follows. According to his 1892 ideas, any continuum 
contains infinitesimal parts. Obviously, anything which can 
be divided an indefinite number of times can be divided into 
points which are infinitesimally small. Even his conception 
of a continuum without parts admits that for ~ommon-sense 
purposes a continuum may be conceived as ·"that all of whose 
parts have parts of the same kind" (6.168) and thereby implies 
that !i "common-sense" continuum can be divided into infini-
tesimal points. Now, says Peirce, consider any point on a 
continuous line and suppose it to have any character whate,ver, 
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such as blueness (1.166). Peirce speaks of blue points, but 
since everything colored must have some extension, he obviously 
is referring to blue ~ rather than to mathematical points. 
If any dot within an inch of a blue dot is to be painted blue, 
the entire line will be painted blue. But this result will 
not necessarily follow if every dot infinitesimally near a 
blue dot is painted blue. Thus, the same mode of reasoning 
does not apply to both finite and infinitesimal quantities 
(1.166). Peirce invokes this principle to establish that 
since immediate consciousness cannot embrace a finite period 
of time, it must cover an infinitesimal period (6.110). 
For Peirce, consciousness and its content are one rela-
tion, as discussed above. Therefore, if consciousness is, 
continuous through an infinitesimal period, its content must 
also be continuous through that period. Thus, consciousness 
immediately perceives the temporal sequence of the beginning, 
middle, and end of the infinitesimal period of time which it 
covers (6.111). The relation of this theory to James's 
psychic fringe will be discussed in co~nection with James's 
specious present in section 3ii. 
Now, Peirce assumes that another infinitesimal interval 
follows the first such that the beginning of the second inter-
val is the middle of the first and the middle of the second 
is the end of the first. Again, consciousness immediately 
perceives the beginning, middle, and end of the second moment. 
(A moment is an infiriitesimal duration and an instant is any 
point in time.) From the two immediate perceptions (of the 
first and second moments) consciousness derives a mediate, 
or inferential perception of the relation of the four in-
stants. The succession of the four instants is immediately 
perceived but their relation is inferred in the second moment. 
Peirce says it is "completely embraceatt in the second moment, 
or in the 11 last two-thirds" of the combined interval (6.111). 
It might appear that this mediate perception could occur onl~ 
in the last instant of the last moment, for in the first 
instant of the last moment the last two instants have not yet 
occurred. But Peirce maintains that consciousness immediately 
perceives every instant in an infinitesimal interval during 
every instant of that interval; it need not wait until the 
last instant of a moment in order to know the entire moment. 
This is indicated in his statement that "what is present to 
the mind at any ordinary instant is what is present during a 
moment in which that instant occurs. Thus, the present is 
half past and half to come." (6.126} 
Peirce continues his demonstration by stating that if 
there is an "indefinite succession of these inferential acts 
of comparative perception •••• the last moment will contain 
objectively the last series." (6.111) That is, an indefinite 
succession of inferences presupposes an indefinite succession 
of overlapping moments, or infinitesimal intervals. Each 
inference is mediately aware of the relation of all the 
instants within its noment and the preceding moment on which 
it overlaps and with which it has instants in common. If ··the 
moment on which it overlaps cqntains a mediate inference of 
the relation of the instants within it and the preceding 
moment on which it overlaps, the mediate inference in the 
most recent moment also mediately perceives the relation of 
all tne mediate perceptions, whieh means that it mediately 
perceives the relation of all the instants within all the . 
moments. If there is a continuous flow of inference, then 
the last inference mediately perceives all that preceded it. 
Before continuing with Peirce's demonstration, it is 
pertinent to examine it thus far. There are four main 
objections: the first is that his argument could be con-
strued to establish that consciousness is immediately aware 
of all the time which preceded a given moment, not only of 
that past within an infinitesimal duration; the second is 
that if the first objection is invalid, then his argument 
establishes o~ly its basic premise, namely, that conscious-
ness i.s immediately aware of the instants in an infinitesimal 
interval; the third objection is that the mediate perception 
of the relation of immediate perceptions interrupts the 
continuity of consciousness; the fourth objection is that the 
mediate perception of the relation of all the mediate percep-
tions and therefore of all the instants in the time considered 
does not establish the possibility of discursive knowledge. 
Regarding the first objection, consider the three 
instants which mark the beginning, middle, and end of an 
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infinistesimal moment and label them respectively A, B, and c. 
Because each instant of that. interval is immediately present 
to consciousness throughout that interval, the consciousness 
of each instant is also consciousness of all the other in-
stants. That is, at instant A consciousness immediately per-
ceives instants B and G; at instant B consciousness immedi-
ately perceives A and G; and at instant G consciousness im-
' 
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mediately perceives instants B and A. In each case, conscious-
ness also immediately perceives the infinitude of instants 
between A, B, and G. Now, the second moment overlaps the 
first such that its beginning is instant B and its middle is 
instant G. Let us call its final instant D. Peirce maintains 
that during the second moment, BCD, consciousness is mediately 
aware of the relation of the four instants A, B, C, and D. 
But, if at instants B and G consciousness immediately per-
ceives A, then during the second moment, which contains B and 
G, it would seem that consciousness immediately perceives A 
because the immediate perception of· A at instants B and C has 
just been established. This is the same principle that Peirce 
himself used in stating that if consciousness immediately per-
ceives a sensation which occurred a'' half second ago, it 
immediately perceives a sensation which occurred a half 
second before that (6.110). Even at instant D consciousness 
should immediately perceive instant A because at instant D it 
immediately perceives instants B and C, during which it immedi-
I 
ately perceives instant A, and consciousness must immediately 
perceive everything that it immediately perceives in an in-
stant which it immediately perceives.· Peirce contends that 
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at instant D consciousness has a mediate perception of the 
relation of the four instants. Let that contention be granted. 
According to the objection, at instant D consciousness has an 
immediate perception of A and of every other instant. Further, 
if a third moment, ODE, follows BCD in such a way that its 
beginning is at instant C and its middle at instant D, then 
by the same principle, consciousness should immediately per-
ceive both the first and second moments throughout the third 
moment, even during its final instant E. Thus, by this argu-
ment, consciousness immediately perceives all past time. 
By this principle it might be thought that consciousness 
immediately perceives all of future time as well as all o~ 
past time, for if at instant A consciousness immediately per-
ceives instants B and C, and at instants B and C it immediate-
ly perceives instant D, then at instant A, consciousness 
should immediately perceive instant D, which is the final 
instant of a different moment. If at instant D consciousness 
iw~ediately perceives instant E and succeeding instants, it 
should immediately perceive these instants during instant A. 
Thus, consciousness would immediately perceive the past and 
future, in any one instant. 
Peirce avoids the latter problem because the future ,is 
not yet a reality. The subsequent discussion of his cosmogo'ny 
in section 51 :reveals that for Peirce, reality is constantly 
evolving. Time, too, as the form of change (6.132), is 
,, 
constantly evolving (6,200). Thus, future time is a possi-
bility {6.325). Further, it is a completely indeterminate 
possibility because, as will be seen, chance is a reality 
which constantly effects variations. Therefore, consciousness 
can perceive only the determinate time which has been actual-
ized. But, as seen above, Peirce's argument seems to demon-
strata that consciousness immediately perceives all the time 
which preceded a given moment. 
However, Peirce would say that !& an instant, conscious-
ness does not immediately perceive past instants as if they 
were present at that instant. Rather, consciousness perceives 
the continuity of instants, including the continuity of pre-
vious instants. That is, in the above illustration, during 
moment BCD which overlaps and contains portions of moment ABC, 
consciousness perceives that instant B is continuous with 
instant ~of the previous moment, and that the two moments 
are continuous. In that sense, consciousness perceives in-
stant A during moment BCD. But consciousness does not per-
ceive instant A as being present in moment BCD. "The 
infinitesimally past is [only] in a measure present." (1.170) 1 
That is, the past is perceived as being continuous with the 
present. Thus, during moment BCD consciousness perceives 
1. Underlining mine. 
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instant A as being continuous with instant B. 
The second objection to Peirce's demonstrat~on argues 
that if the first objection is invalid, his argument proves 
nothing beyond its basic premise, namely; that immediate 
consciousness embraces an infinitesimal period of time. 
If it should be established that a totally different 
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mode of reasoning applies to discussion of infinitesimal inter-
vals and that during the second moment of two overlapping in-
tervals consciousness does not immediately p~rceive what it 
immediately perceives in an instant 'which it does immediately 
perceive, then consciousness immediately perceives only wbat 
occurs within an infinitesimal period. It can only mediately 
perceive the relation between the present moment and past 
moments. Thus, Peirce stilill has not demonstrated that a past 
idea is immediately present to consciousness once the infini-
tesimal interval in which that idea occurred has passed. 
But,- as seen above, he does maintain that consciousness per-
ceives a past idea as being continuous with a present idea. 
A third objection to Peirce's argument is that the act 
of mediate perception in the overlapping moments breaks the 
continuity of thought. His definition of continuity stat~s 
that every part of a continuous series has parts of the same 
kind and that a continuum is mt interrupted by parts of a 
foreigp. kind (see page 6'7 ) • Now, the continuity of thought 
consists of immediate perceptions within a moment. The 
mediate perception of their relation is a perception of a 
• di~~erent kind, thus breaking the continuity o~ immediate per-
ceptions. However, both immediate perceptions and mediate 
perceptions are perceptions. Therefore, the continuity of 
. '• 
thought is not interrupted by parts o~ a different kind. 
The fourth objection is that the mediate perception o~ 
the relation of all the mediate perceptions in the overlapping 
moments does not mean that a past idea is present other t'han 
mediately or inferentially. Since the validity of inferential 
knowledge is always questionable, Peirce still has not estab-
lished the certainty of knowledge o~ events outside the 
infinitesimal interval in which the cognitive act occurs. 
However, Peirce does not intend to~tablish the certainty 
of knowledge. On the contrary, he emphasizes the uncertainty 
o~ knowledge. Since consciousness cannot know that an idea 
which occurred outsid~ the present, infinitesimal interval is 
the same as a present idea, all ~nowledge is fallible. This 
accords with his doctrines of evolution and tychism, dis-
cussed in section 5. 
It should be noted that Peirce intends his argument 'to 
prove the continuity of both time and thought. He conceives 
consciousness and its content as a relation. Hence, the 
consciousness of time and the content of time within conscious-
ness are the same reality. If consciousness immediately per-
ceives time throughout a continuous interval no matter how 
short, time is continuous throughout that interval. His 
application of continuity to the rest of reality will be 
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• discussed in connection with his metaphysics in section 51. 
Peirce advances a reason for the continuity of thought 
in his theory that every thought is a sign and the function 
of a sign is to represent an object to another thought which 
interprets it. Since the interpretant, or interpreting 
thought, is also a sign, it too must determine another 
interpreting thought ad infinitum (5.284). It is true that a 
train of thought may be interrupted, but there is no reason 
to think that it is broken off altogether. The thought may 
continue subconsciously. Peirce further maintains that a 
thought can be determined only by a previous thought. It can 
represent its object only nso far as that object is itselt of 
the nature of a sign or thought." (1.538) The sign does not 
affect the object but is affected by·the object; therefore 
the object must be able to convey thought. Apparently only 
thought can convey thought because Peirce concludes that ~he 
object must be of the nature of a thought, or sign (1.538). 
Therefore, thought ~s continuous because the object which 
determined a given thought was itself determined by a thought 
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ad infinitum, and each thought is interpreted by another thou~ht 
which ifl interpreted by another ~bought ad infinitum. These 
two infinite regresses explain why thought is continuous and 
also explain Peirce's contention that the entire universe 
is a representamen, as will be discussed in connection with 
his metaphysics. 
ii. James's Theory 
James also insists that for the sake of reasoned dis-
course and the development of knowledge, consciousness must 
somehow be able to connect past and present ideas and to 
recognize similar ideas as ~imilar and different ideas a~ 
different. Thus, he too formulates a theory of the continuity 
of consciousness. 
Chapter II describes James's nhalo" of felt relations 
surrounding thoughts. To re~apitulate, in addition to knowing 
the object it is named for, every thought has at least a dim 
awareness of the object's relations, including a feeling of 
what preceded and what is expected to follow a given idea. 
The knowledge of some other part of the mental stream is 
mixed with ou~ knowl~dge of the present. James develops this 
in his notion of the specious present. 1 
The absolute present is never realized in sensible ex-
perience. It is gone before it can be fully represented to 
consci0usness. Even the minimum period of time that can be 
attended to has a beginning, middle, and end. There is no 
nknife-edgett present that can be cognized. ttReflection leads 
us to the conclusion that it ~exist, but that it ~ 
exist can never be a fact of immediate experience." 2 Despite 
this reflection, James's reality is sensible experience. 
Since-the knife-edge present cannot be experienced, it is ,not 
1. James, PSY I, p. 609. 2. Ibid. 
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real. nThere is literally no such object as the present 
moment except as an unreal postulate of abstract thought."1 
Since the minimum time that can be cognized is a dura-
tion with an earlier and a later part, James refers to it as 
I 
the specious present. True to his conviction that coneepti'on 
is inposed on experience after it has occurred, James says 
that we feel the interval of time as a whole and only later 
do we conceptually distinguish the parts in it. The nucleus 
of the specious present is a period of approximately twelve 
seconds which is "the maximum filled duration of which we can 
be both distinctly and immediately aware. tt 2 James's inter-
pretation of ."immediate awareness" must be examined befor·e 
his specious present can be compared to the infinitesimal 
interval which Peirce believes to be embraced by conscious~ 
ness. 
James's · :; ·:. p:eri:9d::.. · of "immediate awareness" · . i •• 
~s the time in which humanlsubjects in laboratory experiments 
could detect a group of sensory impressions as a united 
cluster. That is, the subjects experienced a series of audi-
tory impressions in varying time intervals. The experimenters 
were trying to determine the extent of the unitary conscious-
i . . 3 ness, or grouping, of success ve ~mpress1ons. It was found 
1. James, APU, p. 282. 2. James, PSY I, p. 613. 
3. Ibid., pp. 612-13. Report of experiments conducted by 
Wundt and Dietze. 
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that up t0 forty auditory impressions could be recognized as 
a unit and remembered as a whole if they were presented ~t 
intervals ranging from three-tenths of a second to eighteen-
hundredths of a second and if the mind could grasp them in 
rhythmical groups, such as five groups of eight strokes. Forty 
multiplied by three-tenths of a second yields the result.' of 
twelve seconds as the maximum period through which the subjects 
could perceive and remember a group of auditory impressions as 
a group. This recognition of a group of impressions is what 
.James means by "immediate awareness." Its duration varies con-
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siderably. The minimum duration clearly distinguished experi-
mentally was ascertained by Exner who distinctly heard two snaps 
of an electric ·s.park when the interval between them was 0.00205 
seconds. 1 Thus the duration of the specious present is variable. 
The ~ucleus of .James's specious present is surrounded by 
a fringe of psychic processes caused by sensations occurring 
before the nucleus and expectations of what will succeed it. 
The "immediate" awareness, that is, the mental grouping of 
events within the central period, also is due to overlapping 
brain processes. They are stronger than the processes which 
cause the fringe because the impressions causing the sensa-
tions with the nucleus are more recent • 
.James says that the "time sense" originates in the 
specious present, "t.he short duration of which we are immedi-
ately and instantly sensible,"2 but within which we are aware 
of an earlier and a later part. 
Before continuing with .James's consideration of the 
consciousness of time, it is worthwhile t0 compare his 
1. ~., pp. 613-14. 2. Ibid., p. 631. 
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immediate awareness in the specious present with Peirce's 
continuity of consciousness throughout an infinitesimal 
interval. 
The most obvious distinction is the length of the 
duration: Peirce's interval is infinitesimal; James's is a 
finite period consisting of about twelve seconds plus what-
ever time, finite or infinitesimal, is occupied by the fringe. 
For Peirce, immediate awareness is the immediate perception 
of all instants of an infinitesimal interval during that 
interval. For James it is the distinct recognition of ~ 
group of impressions as a group. The specious present has an 
earlier and a later part and in the beginning of the int,erval 
consciousness cannot directly perceive the later part. It 
can only anticipate what will come later. 
Peirce would consider James's immediate perception to 
be mediate perception. Peirce would say that when any one 
impression is experienced within the nucleus of James's 
specious present, consciousness only mediately perceives the 
other impressions which are recognized as a group because 
overlapping brain processes cause feelings of past sensations 
and anticipation of future ones. These feelings are mediate 
' awareness of past and future events. The feelings are 
immediate experiences but they only mediately perceive the 
sensations and ideas which they represent. 
The "fringe" surrounding the nucleus of James's sp'ecious 
present may appear to be a closer approximation of Peirce's 
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immediate perception of all the instants within the same 
moment. But again, James's feeling of sensations that were 
or will be experienced is what Peirce would call mediate per-
ception of those sensations. But Peirce claims that conscious-
ness immediately perceives all the sensations that occur 
within an infinitesimal interval. Mediate perception is 
required only for the relation of instants within pverlapping 
moments. Mediate perception throughout a finite period of 
time does not contradict anything in Peirce's theory, for he 
does not deny mediate perception within a finite time. But 
James does not recognize any mental phenomenon corresponding 
to Peirce's immediate perception of all that occurs within an 
infinitesimal interval during every instant of that interval. 
In fact, since the knife-edge present is gone before it can 
be cognized, and since it cannot be smaller than infinitesi-
mal, an infinitesimal interval is not real in that it cannot 
be experienced. If, somehow, it is lar~r than the knife-
edge present, or if it is somehow real, we can have no suc-
cession of ideas within such an interval. The most we could 
have would be a part of an idea, too small to be cognized 
independently. 
Peirce's infinitesimal interval involves three modes of 
being: th~ immediate perception is firstness, the sensation 
of another moment as an other is secondness, and the mediate 
perception of the relation of all the moments is inference, 
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or thirdness. Since James recognizes only one mode of being, 
his specious present represents one mode of being. 
Peirce's demonstration of the continuity of conscious-
ness throughout a moment implies the continuity of time 
throughout that moment, for consciousness and its content are 
one. James shares this unitary view of consciousness but he 
specifies that time in itself cannot be perceived apart from 
its sensible content. Now, when we are conscious we are 
always aware of some sensory stimuli. Even tho.ugh we may try 
to "empty our mindslt we are at least aware of such things as 
' 
our heartbeats, the rhythm of our breathing, or of fleet'ing 
ideas which enter the mind. Along with such processes g,oes 
the sense of the time that they last. Awareness of time with-
out sensible content is not possible. 
Peirce's position regarding the perception of time apart 
from other perceptions is questionable. That consciousness 
can perceive time in itself is indicated by his statement: 
"In an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the 
temporal sequence of its beginn~ng, middle and end •••• 11 
(6.111) He does not indicate that we perceive temporal 
sequence only in perceiving other facts or ideas. Further, 
he says that after the second moment has overlapped the first, 
"we gain a mediate, or inferential, perception of the rela-
tion of all four instants." (6.111) Again, he does not 
specify that we gain this mediate perception of relation only 
in the perception of other relations. These statements imply 
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that consciousness does perceive time apart from other ~er­
ceptions. 
On the other hand, Peirc~ says, "~ime • • • logically 
involves some other kind of continuity than its own. Time, 
as the universal form of change, cannot exist unless there is 
som~thing to undergo change •••• " (6.132) But the fact 
that time involves another continuity does not mean that we 
perceive time only when we perceive that other continuity. 
However, since time is the ~ of change, Peirce may mean 
that a form cannot be perceived apart from something to which 
it applies. In that case he would agree with James that 
consciousness perceives the temporal sequence of an interval 
only in the perception of the events or states of mind 
throughout the interval. But he does not specify that this 
is his understanding of the term "form't and unless he assumes 
that this is the generally accepted use of the term, his 
remarks about the immediate perception of instants must be 
construed to mean that consciousness can perceive time in 
itself. Of course, for Peirce perception is a feeling. 
Therefore, if consciousness perceives time, consciousness 
feels time. But this is not equivalent to James's claim that 
consciousness can perceive, or feel, time only in connection 
with other feelings. 
To return to James's discussion of the continuity of 
thought: he believes that consciousness is "immediately" 
aware of events occurring in the specious present, a brief, 
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finite duration conceived to have a beginning, middle, and 
end. The sensations experienced within that interval are 
grouped together as a result of lingering brain processes 
which were active in a maximal degree during and immediately 
after the impressio~s which caused them. Other brain 
processes caused by the physiological aspects of the act of 
anticipation suggest the impressions which are about to come. 
Thus, consciouspess is continuous throughout the specious 
present because the conscious correlate of these overlapping 
brain processes is the mental grouping together of their 
stimuli. The experienced continuity of the duration of the 
specious present is the prototype of our idea of time. 
We also experience continuity in the perceptions within 
every duration. Duration cannot be perceived apart from other 
perceptions but the perceptions of any duration fuse into one 
another. 
In the pulse of inner life immediately present 
now in each of us is a little past, a little 
future, a little awareness of our own body, of 
each other's persons, of these sublimities we 
are trying to talk about, of the earth's 
geography and the duration of history, of 
truth and error, of good and bad, and of who 
knows how much more? Feeling, however dimly 
and subconsciously, all these things, your 
pulse of inner life is continuous with them, 
belongs to them and they to it.l 
Physiologically the simultaneity of these many perceptions is 
due to the overlapping brain processes of the psychic fringe. 
1. James, APU, pp. 286-7. 
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But whatever the physiological aspect, this interpenetration 
of feelings is an experience of continuity. 
The minimum datum of conscious experience is continuous 
not only in its own duration and in its ran~ of feelings; it 
also feels continuous with other durations of experience. 
Sensible experiences flow into one another; precise demarca-
tion of their boundaries is impossible. 
The continuity of experience is sometimes known to be 
interrupted by time-gaps caused by sleep or other unconscious 
states. James says that in such instances the consciousness 
is interrupted "in the time sense"1 but it is continual in 
that the parts (the conscious states before and after the gap) 
are "inwardly connected112 and-belong to the ncommon whole" 3 
of conscious states which constitutes the personality. That 
is, although there are times when conscious states do not 
exist, those which exist after the gap feel continuous with 
those which existed before it. Both the earlier and the later 
states feel the intimacy which distinguishes all the states 
forming a personality. In that sense they feel continuous 
with each other •. 
Since the origin, or cause, of felt experience is of 
the same nature as experience, continuity is just what we 
feel it to be in the interpenetration of perceptions and the 
1. James, PSY I, p.2B8. 2. illS!.· 3. Ibid. 
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flow of duration. Continuity does not exist independently 
of experience. But experience is continuous. 
Continuous experiences do not resist James's conceptual 
definition of continuity as having parts immediately next to 
each other with nothing between. As noted above, the "parts" 
of the-experience continuum are perceptions and feelings, in-
cluding transitive thoughts. Since all thought is reducible 
to these mental states, there can be no other conscious 
states between these mental states. Therefore, the·re is no 
consciousness between the parts of the mental stream which is 
not itself part of the mental stneam. Hence, James's con-
ceptual definition of continuity applies to what is felt in 
conscious experience. 
There are several problems in James's doctrine. Some 
of them were recognized by James himself. 
First, within the few seconds of the specious present, 
bow is it possible to think of events which happened years, 
perhaps centuries apart. For instance, James asks how it is 
possible to think of the Creation, then of the Christian era, 
then of the battle of Waterloo, all within a few seconds.1 
This problem·is easily resolved because the specious present 
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is of sufficient duration to allow successive acts of thinking. 
The events represented by the thoughts occurred long ago, but 
1. Ibid., p. 638. 
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the thoughts occur in the present. The specious present 
contains all direct experiences, including those which repre-
sent events occurring at times far removed. 
A more serious problem is involved in the recogni,tion 
that the succession of feelings is not the same psychic fact 
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as the feeling of succession. 1 One impression may follow another 
without the mind's awareness that it has followed that other, 
or that the other ever occurred. If the past is to be known 
as past, it "must be known with what is present, and during 
the 'present' spot of time." 2 If A is to be known as following 
B, both A and B must be known simultaneously. Knowledge of a 
past thought as past must be in present consciousness. This 
problem applies even to the specious present, for although 
overlapping brain processes cause .the mind to group to'gether 
impressions occurring within that interval, the specious 
present has an earlier and a later part. There is no certainty 
that the present feelings represent events which actually 
occurred. James does little more than recognize this problem. 
He says that the distinct awareness of events occurring in 
the specious present is due to "some fairly constant feature 
in the brain-processes to which the consciousness is tied." 3 
This feature "whatever it be" 4 is the cause of our perception 
l. Ibid., pp. 628-9. 
3. Ibid., p. 630. 
2. Ibid., p. 629. 
4. ~-
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of time. That is, there is some characteristic of the brain 
which causes us to recognize the succession of events within 
a brief interval as a succession, but what that.characteristic 
is, James does not know. This mysterious feature is the 
cause of our feeling of continuity and of our sense of time. 
The problem is much more acute when applied to the 
memory of events that occurred long before the specious 
present. James's explanation of memory does not provide a 
satisfactory solution. He defines mE?mory as 'lthe knowledge 
of an event, or fact, of which meantime we have not been 
thinking, with the additional consciousness that we have 
thought or experienced it before.n1 It involves a feeling 
of pastness. For James the "immediate It perception of pastness 
does not extend beyond the few seconds embraced in the 
specious present, so the feeling of a past before the specious 
present is a conception rather than "immediate•' perception. 
In fact, as discussed above, James 1 s uirnmediate 11 perception 
' of the past part o~ the specious present is itself a mediate 
perception of past sensations. This presents an even stronger 
case for the conceptual aspect of a past antedating the 
specious present. At any rate, the feeling of "the p'ast" is 
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a concepti0n derived from the duration of the specious present. 
The remembered event is conceived as "lying along" 2 the 
past direction and is thought with other events, objects, and 
l. Ibid., p. 648. l. ~., p. 650. 
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names which ''date'' the remembered event. In ~ddition, the 
remembered event and its context must be felt·as part of~ 
past and the experience must be connected with ~ present. 
That is, the idea of an event and its accompanying feeling of 
,, 
pastness must be thought in the present with thoughts and 
feelings of my present. 
So far, the memory of the past involves the same ele-
ments as the imagination of a past. But a remembered past 
event differs from an imagined past event in that the remem-
bered event is believed in. Thus, "the ob,ject of memory is 
only an object imagined in the past (usually very completely 
imagined there) to which the emotion of belief adheres',. ul 
As discussed in Chapter II, belief is a feeling of certainty. 
Thus, remembered events are those which are felt to have 
actually occurred in a time preceding tbe specious present. 
Since they are felt to have occurred, the past events are 
considered real. Once again, feeling constitutes reality. 
However, James's explanation still does not distinguish 
between an imaginary event which is strongly believed in and 
a real event which is either believed or disbelieved. The 
strongest feelings of belief adhere to hallucinations and to 
imaginary experiences of the mentally deranged. 
10 3 
Nor does the physiological explanation of memory explain 
how a present state of consciousness can be certain it knows a, 
past state. According to the law of association. of ideas, 
1. Ibid., p. 652. 
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"when two elementary brain processes have been active ~ogether 
or in immediate succession, one of them, on reo·c.c.u~rii;J.g·r te·nd~ 
to propagate the excitement into the other. ul Thus, when a 
stimulus is repeated, it usually excites the same nervous 
paths which it excited before, provoking the same response, 
and these nervous paths excite paths which were previously 
excited with or immediately after them. The conscious corre-
late of these processes is the recall of the perceptions and 
images experienced with the original stimulus. That is, the 
stimulus is perceived in its original setting. But the mere 
re-excitation of nerve paths and the recurrence of various per-
captions does not account for the conscious feeling that the 
phenomenon is a recurrence. Two excitations are two excita-
tions, two perceptions are two perceptions. Memory requires 
this consciousness or repetition. 
According to James, this occurs when new stimuli act on 
the nervous paths simultaneously with the repeated stimulus. 
Thus, the repeated stimulus causes a repetition of the per-
ception it originally caused along with other perceptions 
or~ginally associated with it at the same time that new stimuli 
cause perceptions of one's present surroundings. Thus, one 
perceives past facts at the same time that one perceives 
present facts. For instance, while sitting in my study I 
happen to see the theater program of a play which I r~cently 
1. Ibid., p. 566. 
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attended. The sight of the program causes a recurrence of 
other sensations which I experienced with it. I remember the 
play, the theater, and various facts about the occasion. But 
simultaneously I am aware of various sensations which were not 
present when I acquired the theater program, for instance my 
desk, the paper on which I am writing, the books in front of 
me. According to James, the simultaneous occurrence of these 
two sets of perceptions causes recognition of the fact that I, 
who am now sitting in my study, saw this theater program 
before on a certain date and at that time I experienced vari-
ous other sensations. The sight of the theater program 
evokes only those perceptions which originally were reason-
ably strong and sustained. 
But s_imultaneous experience of the two sets of percep-
tions still does not constitute knowledge of the fact ,that my 
present perceptions of the theater were experienced before. 
Two simultaneous perceptions are two simultaneous perceptions, 
both limited to the present moment. My present act of 
imagining the theater performance does not necessarily imply 
that I actually experienced that performance, nor does it 
mean that I now recognize that perception as one which I pre-
viously experienced, either in imagination or fact. Thus, 
James still has not explained how the idea of a past experi-
ence can ·be in present consciousness, nor has he assured the 
similarity of present ideas with others believed to be past. 
0 
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He has not established the possibility of knowledge or 
reasoned discourse. 
5. Metaphysical Development of Continuity 
The importance of the continuity of thought is the place 
,, 
it occupies in the metaphysical positions of Peirce and James. 
Both consider the continuity of consciousness and of time as 
two continua which we directly experience. Both philosophers 
consider this experience as a premise in the construction of 
their metaphysics. 
i. Peirce's Cosmogony 
Since continuity is a reality, Peirce says it is, reason-
able to believe in the continuity of all things (1.170). 
This inference is of questionable validity. It may be reason-
able to hypothesize that ~ things are continuous~ aside 
from thought and time~ but to hypothesize that all things are 
continuous is not yet warranted. But Peirce adopts his 
hypothesis because it explains many difficult metaphysical 
problems. For instance~ if all reality is a continuum~ one 
mind can act on another "because it is in a measure immedi-
ately present to that other; just as we suppose that the 
infinitesimally past is in a measure present." (1.170) One 
portion of' matter can act on another because "it is in a 
measure in the same place." (1.170) 
The doctrine that everything is continuous is called 
synechism. It is best explained in terms of Peirce's 
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evolutionary cosmogony, which is based on the ·three principles 
of continuity, chaace, and positive sympathy. These princi-
ples are active ideas. The efficacy· of ideas is discussed in 
Chapter II. 
' Continuity is prior to any other reality. Without conti-
nuity no other reality could endure.· Continuity is the only 
principle which can sustain itself and develop other realities. 
Tychism is the doctrine that chance (freedom, spontaneity) is 
an active reality·. Chance accounts for variety in the uni-
verse. Agapasm is the principle of "positive sympathyu which 
accou~ts for the connection and association of feelings and 
ideas (6.304). Since feelings and ideas are living realities, 
they can influence each other. These three principles are 
the basis of Peirce's metaphysics. 
Evolution to Peirce means growth, which is both increase 
and diversification (1.174). Peirce maintains that all evo-
lution proceeds from the vague to the definite, from the more 
general to the more diversified (1.174, 6.191). He decides 
this on an empirical basis, for the increase of variety in 
nature is evident. 
Were things simpler, was variety less in the 
original nebula from which the solar system is 
supposed to have grown·than it is row when the 
land and sea swarms with animal and vegetable 
forms with their intricate anatomies and still 
more wonderful economies? It would seem as if 
there were an increase in variety, would it 
not? (1.174) 
Because evolution proceeds from th~ more general to the 
c 
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more definite, Peirce says that the universe of existence has 
evolved from a world of ideas, from a Platonic world. This 
accords with his conception of ideas as generality, and 
existence as individuality, discussed in Chapter II. Ideas 
have evolved from more general ideas which evolved from 
feelings. Feeling, being firstness or possibility, is the 
most general reality. Even firstness evolved from a more 
general possibility, for Peirce says the feelings and sense-
qualities we now experience represent the s~allest portion of 
the original continuum of qualities. "The development of the 
human mind has practically extinguished all feelings • '• •• •' 
(6.132), for development necessarily involves delineation and 
limitation. Originally feelings had an endless number of 
dimensions (6.132). Even now, when any particular kind of 
feeling is present, "an infinitesimal continuum of all feel-
ings differing infinitesimally from that is present." (6.132) 
Since continuity is prior to everything else and since 
Peirce equates continuity with generality (6.190), Peirce 
maintains that everything has evolved from a "general vague 
nothing-in-particularness" (6.200) which was the original, 
vague, multi-dimensional continuum of feeling. The feelings, 
or qualities, did not arise separately and then enter into 
relations with each other in the continuum. Just the reverse 
occurred. The qualities originally were amalgamated in the 
general continuum, and due to the element of chance they 
lOS 
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became discrete, or at any rate, less general. Withou-t the 
reality of chance, the original continuum would have con-
tinue~ in its original state. 
Peirce says that feelings are sentient and living 
(6.201). Again because of chance, they entered into acciden-
tal relations with each other. These reactions are events. 
Because any one feeling is part of a continuum of feelings, 
these reactions tend to generalize and spread to other feel-
ings. A particular reaction will not spread to the entire 
range of ~eelings but, by the principle of agapas~, only to 
those which are in a particular state of affectability. That 
is, the reactions will connect only those feelings which 
somehow are in ''positive sympathy" with the reactors and 
therefore are influenced by the reaction. General ideas are 
the result of this association. "General ideas are living 
feelings spread out.tt (6.143) Thus, general ideas result 
from the association and reaction of feelings. 
Because feelings are living and sentient, ideas are 
living aqd sentient. They too assimilate each other and 
repeat their interactions. In fact, this characteristic is 
represented in the central part of the law of mind, which 
states: 
ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect 
certain others which stand to them in a peculiar 
relation of affectibility. In this spreading 
they lose intensity, and especially the power of 
affecting others, but gain generality and become 
welded with other ideas. (6.104) 
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When continuity cau~es a ~epetition of the ~eactions between 
feelings and ideas, the ~esult is the fo~mation of habits. 
These habits also a~e general ideas (6.151, 6,204). 
Pei~ce ~efers to the "world of ideas," 9r ''Plato.nic 
worlds" (6.192, unde~lining mine). These probably result 
f~om the association of general ideas. At any rate, from one 
of the constantly developing Platonic wo~lds evolved the wo~ld 
of existence. Here the principle of continuity imbues all 
things with the tendency to habit formation. In the wo~ld. of 
existence the habitual ~epetition of ~eactions between 
gene~al ideas are manifest as physical laws. This accounts 
fo~ Peirce's theory that physical laws are real active ideas, 
as discussed in Chapter II. Habit is not rest~icted to mental 
phenomena. It is a tendency .to behave in a certain way on the 
occurrence of a general event, that is, of a kind of stimulus. 
"The stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming 
.. 
a habit." (5.492) Dead matter is the result of the complete 
I 
I 
inau~ation of living feeling by habit. That is, there is a 
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continuity between mind and matter such that matter is mind 
that has become so completely habit-bound that it behaves "with 
a peculiarly high degree of mechanical regula~ity, or routine." 
(6.277) Since all things are continuous, '~all phenomena are 
of one characte~, though some are more mental and spontaneous, 
others more material and regular." (7.570) But this dis-
tinction between the "more mentaln and the "more material·" 
threatens the homogeneity of continuity, for often there is 
0 
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at best~ fine distinction.between gradation in kind and 
difference in kind. 
So far does Peirce extend his synechism that he will 
not accept any form of separation. · Synechism applies to the 
conception of personal identity, for the salT is part of a 
communtty of selves. In addition to the carnal consciousness, 
man al~o has a social consciousness "by -which a man's spirit 
is emb0died in others • • • ·" (7.575) Apparently man's 
ideas form a continuum with those of other men. This provides 
for sympathy and communication. 11All communication from mind 
to mind is through continuity of being." (7.572) Further, 
"man is capable of a spiritual consciousness which constitutes 
him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the 
universe as a whole.n (7.576) Thus, man embodies certain 
general ideas. This correlates with Peirce's concept of all 
reality as thought and of the entire universe as a sign. 
This will be further examined subsequently. 
Since all things constantly evolve, habits, laws, and 
general ideas are evolving. Time, as the form of change, is 
constantly evolving. Existence is one stage in the evolution-
ary process from the more general to the less general. Every 
reality does not need to evolve into the world of existence 
as part of its ·development, but it does need nto enter into 
~ theatre of reactions, of which this is one. n (6.195) 
Since existence evolved from the world of ide·as, the world of 
I 11 
.. 
c 
0 
·112 
existence is an embodiment of thought. 
Before continuing with the exposition of Peirce's meta-
physics, let us examine it so far. 
First, Peirce says that general ideas result from ~he 
association of feelings. But the original vagueness is a 
continuum of feeling which has not yet become differentiated 
into distinct feelings; the feelings have not yet begun their 
interactions. Therefore; the continuity of the original 
potentiality evidently is a reality which does not need to 
evolve from feelings. It is inherent in the original 
potentiality. This is perfectly plausible because continuity 
is Peirce's original principle and therefore he may exempt it 
from tbe processes which derive from it. 
The second observation concerns the order of the evo-
lutionary process. Since evolution proceeds from the more 
general to the less general, and since general ideas evolve 
from feelings, feelings must be mo~e general than general 
' ideas. But this is contrary to Peir.ce 's assertion that 
general ideas result from the generalization of reactions 
between feelings. This theory implies that general ideas 
~ are more general than feelings, and that the more general has 
evolved from the less general, in contradiction to the evo-
lutionary hypothesis. Also contrary to this evolutionary 
principle is the law of mind, which states that ideas~ as well 
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as feelings, gain generality as they spread. Again, the more 
general develops from the less general, in contradiction to 
his evolutionary principle. 
The third criticism questions Peirce's theory that 
general ideas are the result of the association of feelings. 
They appear to be more than a collection of feelings. Peirce 
says that it is impossible to think without some kind of 
signs. General ideas are signs which ~pply to more than one 
objec~. James points out that the lower animals do not think 
in that they are not aware of signs as signs. 1 Chauncey 
Wright also points out that human thought differs from that 
of animals 1n ·that human consciousness can substitute outward 
s.igns for inward images caused by sense impressions and thus 
think about signs apart from the sense impressions th~y 
2 
represent. That is, although an animal may be conditioned 
to respond in a certain way to a given stimulus, his ~esponse 
is an associative act not involving cognition of the stimulus 
as a sign. He does rot connect "the present stimulus with 
similar previous stimuli and consider the stimulus to be a 
sign requiring the same response elicited by the prevlous 
stimuli. But animals certainly are capable of feeling. 
Further, these feelings may generalize in that the affected 
nerve cells e~cite other nerve cells so that the feeling 
1. James, PSY II, pp. 356-60. 
2. Chauncey Wright, R~OCW, pp. 76-7. 
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spreads. For instance, an animal may feel pain and the 
feeling may spread from the original injury to other parts 
.,'ii' 
of the body. But an animal is rot considered to have tl:le 
general.idea of pain. He does not associate the pain with a 
sign, llpain, n and connect both with other pains. He merely 
has a certain feeling which covers a certain area. If the 
' pain spreads to a larger area, he is aware of the feeling but 
still does not compare the larger pain with the smaller pain, 
or connect either with a sign. He does rot have the general 
idea of pain even though he does have a feeling of pain. 
This is evidence that general ideas must be more than a 
grouping of feelings. 
Within the terms of Peirce's system there are objections 
I 
to his equating general ideas with the spreading of feelings. 
Feelings are qualities, firstness. Reactions, including 
as·sociations, are events, or secondness. General ideas are 
thirdness. Peirce maintains that the mere addition of first-
ness and secondness does not constitute thirdness. Thirdness 
is the relation of eonnection between first and second (1.337). 
Thirdness rtis that which is what it is by virtue of imparting 
a quality to reactions in the future." (1.343) Sine~ feelings 
are ·qualities, obviously they do impart quality to tl:leir inter-
actions. But the result of the addition of feelings to each 
other is not the relation between feelings and events. It is 
the addition of feelings and events. It· is not the relation 
c 
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between firstness and secondness. It is the addition of first-
ness and secondness. But thirdness is the relation between 
firstness and secondness. Thirdness is not the addition of 
firstness and secondness. Therefore, general ideas, third-
ness, must be more than the addition of firstness and second-
ness; therefore geiEral ideas must be more than the addition 
of feelings. 
The concept of habits as general ideas needs explaining. 
A habit is a tendency to act or think in a certain way follow-
ing a stimulus of a given kind. A habit is identified, not by 
the behavior. observed on one occasion, but by all the actions 
that ever ·will or ever could occur whenever that kind of 
stimulus is operative. Therefore, a habit is expressed by a 
general idea, or a general proposition, that is, one which 
applies to every conceivable instance in which the ha~it 
could conceivably be operative. Habits are general ideas 
because habits are tendencies to action. The repetition pf 
these actions manifests a habit. As seen in Chapter 'II, Peirce 
maintains that general ideas are living and active; they pro-
duce physical effects. Therefore, he equates them with the 
tendency which results in certain kinds of events. That is, 
he equates them with habits and laws. They are "a conscious 
continuum of feeling" (6.152). Therefore, "to say that • • • 
phenomena are governed by law does not mean merely that they 
are describable by a general formula; but that there is a 
·living idea •• • • •• ( 6.152) This living idea governs events. 
• 
This theory constitutes the most important part of Peirce's 
realism. 
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Thus 1 all being is of the nature of thought, for it 
evolves from feelings and general ideas and is governeq by 
ideas~ Within this one mode of being some elements stand to 
each other in relations of first 1 second1 and third. That is~ 
the one mode of being is manifest as feelings, ideas 1 and 
reactions between them. 
Thoughts are signs. Since all reality is thought, 
Peirce says that "the universe is a vast representamen, a 
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions 
in living realities." (5.119) The obje.ct of the symbol is 
"God's purpose1 working out its conclusions in living 
realities." (5.119) Laws and habits are the determinations 
of the deity in working out His purpose. 
Peirce distinguishes a representamen from a sign. A 
sign is "anything which conveys any definite r.otion of an 
object in any way •••• n (1.540) In analyzing1 as thoroughly 
as possible 1 the essential characteristics of a sign1 Peirce 
defines a representamen 11 as being whatever that analysis 
.applies to." (1.540) If the analysis is inaccurate 1 at least 
part of what he has said about a sign is f alse 1 but the 
representamen is whatever does correspond with the analysis~ 
If no existent corresponds to the analysis 1 presumably the 
representamen would be a possibility. If the analysis of 
0 
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signs is correct, there may still be some underlying assump-
tion not specified in the analysis which is true of all signs. 
Simultaneously, there may be something else which the analy-
sis describes but the underlying assumption does not apply 
to it. This other reality is a representamen and differs 
from the sign regarding the presence or absence of whatever 
is involved in the underlying assumption. For instance, 
Peirce says that all signs convey notions to human minds but 
no other representamen need do so. Thus, something which has 
a representative function to a being other than a human being 
but which otherwise fits the description of something that is 
a sign to human beings, is a representamen. 
This would explain Peirce 1 s use of the term "representa-
men11 to indicate that which represents something to God but 
which does not represent the same reality to humans. The 
universe is a representamen because its meaning to God differs 
from its meaning to human minds. 
It is conceivable that some of the problems connected 
with the object of a sign are not applicable to the object of 
a representamen, particularly a representamen for God. For 
instance, section 4i notes that ·only a sign can be the object 
of a sign, for the object affects the sign and must therefore 
be a sign. Therefore, there is an infinite regress of signs. 
If it is also true that only a representamen can be the 
object of a representamen, and if the universe is a 
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representamen o~ God's purpose, then God's purpose must be a 
representamen o~ something which in turn must be a representa-
men, ad infinitum. Since Peirce is so ~ond of the infinite 
regress, he might well agree that God's purpose is not the 
ultimate object. 
The representative ~unction of a representamen, l,ike 
that of a sign, involves an indefinite future. This is 
inherent in its de~inition. 
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic 
relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR 
a third, called its INTERPRETANT,.this triadiy 
relation being such that the BEPRESENTAMEN 
determines its interpretant to stand in the 
same triadic relation to the same object ~or 
some interpretant. (1.541) 
Peirce says this relation cannot consist in any event which can 
have oecurred, for the event would require an interpretant 
"t..rhich stands in the same relation to the object as does the 
representamen. This interpretant, being a representamen, 
would require another representamen ad infinitum. An, endless 
series of events has not occurred. Therefore, the relation 
does not consist in events that have occurred but requires 
an in~inite series of events. Thus, Peirce says the repre~ 
sentative function of a representamen is "in a power of the 
representamen to determine some interpretant to being a 
representamen of the same object." (1.542) This power is a 
tendency of the representamen to manifest certain hapits. 
Thus, the triadic relation of the representamen con-
sists in a process which can be completed only in an 
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indefinite future, if at all. Thus, if reality is a repre-
sentamen of God's purpose, each event gives rise to an 
interpreting event which is a representamen and gives rise to 
another interpretant. This accords with Peirce's idea that 
being is constantly growing, as is assured by the living 
principle of continuity. 
The reality of continuity and of chance lead to ~he 
doctrine of fallibilism, which states that knowledge is never 
absolute but "always swims, ••• in a continuum of uncer-
tainty and indeterminacy." (1.171) Peirce says that "where 
there is continuity, the exact ascertainment of real quanti-
ties is too obviously impossible." (1.172) Exact measurement 
is impossible, for, as noted above, a true continuum has no 
parts and the parts of a "common-sensett continuum are all 
alike. Therefore, one part cannot be distinguished. from 
another. Since chance is an active reality, and since all 
things are constantly growing, laws are subject to slight 
variations which, when repeated, alter the laws and the events 
governed by them. Even laws of uniformity have resulted from 
evolution and are subject to change. Thus, predictions are 
always fallible. The laws which govern events are subject 
to change, and even when fairly stable, they are not obeyed 
precisely. 
In ~act, all our reasoning is fallible because it judges 
"the proportion of something in a whole collection oy the 
proportion found in a sample. 1t (1.141) The sample may differ 
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considerably from the rest of the collection. Even if the 
sample is identical to the present total coll~ction, its 
resemblance to future members of the collection is unascer-
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tainable. Further, since laws are alterable, the future col-
lections may be governed by different laws. Consequently, 
all reasoning and all knowledge is fallible. Reasoning can 
never attain absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, or 
absolute universality (1.141). 
Peirce considers the fallibility of knowledge a corre-
late of synechism, the doctrine of continuity. Both are 
correlative to the conception of the universe as a rep~esenta-
men of God's purpose, for, as seen above, the triadic rela-
tion of a representamen has reference to an indefinite future 
and requires an indefinite number of sign relationships. 
Therefore, knowledge can be certain only in an indefinite 
future. 
To summarize, Peirce uses the continuity he experiences 
in personal consciousness as his metaphysical model. Conti-
nuity is a real, active idea from which all reality evolves, 
and w~ich all reality embodies. The continuity o~ all reality 
I, 
solves many difficult metaphysical problems, such as the 
interaction of mind and body and the action of one mind on 
another. It also accounts for ignorance and error, for exact 
measurement is impossible in a universe in which all things 
flow into one another. 
Peirce's metaphysics is monistic in that all reality is 
of the nature of thought. Within. this monism, however, 1are 
different manifestations of the one reality. The nature of 
thought ensures the continuity of r~ality, for the sign func-
tion of thought has reference to an infinite past and an 
infinite future. The reality of chance accounts for vari-
ation within the essential continuity. Since all things are 
subject to both growth and spontaneous deviation, reality 
changes as it continues~ 
ii. James's Metaphysics 
James's metaphysics develops and expands the four ~ajor 
conceptions discussed so far: th~ reality of sensory or 
feeling experience, tbe· ·.p.lu:r-aliat.ic, theory of reality, the 
relation of experience and consciousness, and the continuity 
of conscious experience. 
As seen in Chapter II, James establishes sense or 
feeling experience as reality. But such experience has a 
different kind of reality than at first appears. Presumably 
he adopts the monistic idea of one kind of reality because it 
allows the interaction of mind and matter. He decides that 
this reality is spiritual, rather than material, in nature 
because the former doctrine has more satisfactory ethical 
implications. He explains this as follows: 
Materialism is the doctrine that 11the laws of physical 
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Mind differs from matter nature are what run things • • • 
only in that mind records facts; it does not produce them. 
Spiritualism is the doctrine that mind not only records facts 
but also governs the-universe. 2 By 11mind, 11 James here means 
not only intellectual processes but also moral ideals. "The 
inner life of things must be substantially akin anyhow to the 
tenderer parts of man's nature in any spiritualistic philoso~ 
phy. n3 
Empirically it is impossible to determine whether 
reality is essentially material or essentially spiritual. 
James opts in favor of spiritualism because it implies a 
world sympathetic to man's moral and emotional interests. A 
universe governed completely by mechanical law will perish, 
and all the struggles, aspirations, loves, and sufferings of 
men throughout the ages will have been in vain. A spi'ritu-
ally controlled universe may also perish but "it guarantees 
an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. 114 The 
aspirations and ideal~ will somewhere be brought to fruition. 
"Tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and 
dissolution not the absolutely final things. n5 The emotional 
and moral interests which here determine James's adoption of 
spiritualism are feelings. Again, feeling determines reality, 
1. James, PRAG, p. 69. 
3. James, APU, p. 31. 
5. ~· 
2. Ibid., p. 70. 
4. James, PRAG., p. 77. 
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and that which we feel to be so is reality. 
Feeling advances other reasbns in favor of the spiritual 
hypothesis. Spiritualism is not only pleasant to contemplate. 
It produces experienceable effects which are preferable to 
those produced by materialism. Spiritualism engenders 
feelings of trust in the universe and encourages consequent 
bravery and optimism. The ideals are worth fighting for 
because they have a lasting place in the larger scheme. 
Materialism, on the other hand, asserts that our ideals and 
aspirations have no lasting importance. There is no point in 
fighting for what we believe because the universe is indiffer-
ent to our interests. Materialism fosters feelings of 
alienation and fear. 
Perhaps the major reason that James adopts the spiritual 
hypothesis is that man feels within himself at leas~ the 
possibility of a "highern self. The thinking individtfal feels 
that there is "something wrong" with his life. This sense of 
wrongness generally applies to moral and ethical matters. 
11So far as he suffers from his wrongness and criticises it,"1 
so far is he beyond it. Dissatisfaction with his wro~gness 
implies there is a better part of him. The person inclined to 
a spiritualistic philosophy identifies his "real selfn with 
this sense of a better self and connects this better self with 
powers outside of himself. 
1. James, VRE, p. 455. 
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He becomes conscious that this higher part 
is conterminous and continuous with a MORE 
of the same quality, which is operative in the' 
universe outside of hi~ and which be can keep 
in working touch with, and in a fashion get on 
board of and save himself when all his lower 
being has gone to pieces in the wreck.l 
The feeling of ethical yearning plus the feelings of confi-
dence and bravery engendered by belief (feeling) that the 
entire universe is sympathetic to those yearnings leads James 
to adopt the theory that all reality is of a spiritual,nature. 
Feeling has decided what, for him, is reality. Feeling, it-
self, is a spiritual reality, for reality consists of a 
plurality of experience (feeling) relationships which are 
of a spiritual essence. 
So far, James's theory does r.ot account for the unethi-
cal person who does not feel a sense of wrongness, even in 
his evil doing. Such a person feels no connection with 
spiritual qualities within or without himself. Ne doubt 
James would reply that the universe is not perfect; there are~ 
lots of tenth-rate men and women. But he adopts the con-
clusions prompted by the feelings of the ethical person rather 
than those of the unethical person because he prefers the 
feelings of optimism and trust implied by the former. His 
feelings of preference lead him to believe, o~ feel certain 
of, the feelings of the ethically concerned person. Feeling 
is reality. Therefore, it is the criterion of reality. 
1. Ibid. 
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Although belief in but one kind of reality is a mQnistic 
view, James rejects any kind of formal monism. According to 
this doctrine, all reality is interconnected and forms one 
totality, outside ·of which there is nothing. The separations 
that we experience are illusory. The apparent parts actually 
form a unity in which every part is related to every other 
part. In a noetic monism unity is achieved by an absolute 
mind which creates the parts by thinking them and in one 
infinitesimal instant, knows every part of what exists. 1 
To be, on this scheme is on the part of a 
finite thing, to be an object for the abso-
lute; and on the part of the absolute it is 
to be the thinker of that assemblage of 
objects.2 
The absolute and the universe have an identical "content." 
That is, the absolute is the knowledge of its objects; the 
objects are what the absolute knows. They are two aspects 
.. 
of one relation. This analogy to the experience relation 
will be developed subsequently. 
James rejects all such formal monisms because they 
contradict experience. Finite minds are not omniscient. 
Ignorance, error, and illusion are inescapable facts in the 
world of existence. Further, the way in which finite minds 
know things differs from that of the absolute mind, which 
knows all things at a glance. Therefore, finite minas are 
not objects of the absolute's knowing. They are knowing 
1. James, SPOP, p. 128. 2. James, APU, pp. 36-7. 
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subjects on their own account. The unity of the infinite 
mind and finite minds contradicts the knowing experience. 
The existence of evil also is incompatible with.abso-
lute monism, unless the absolute is considered imperfect. 
James objects to the monistic position epitomized by Spinoza 
that "Qua absolute the world is one and perfect, qua re'lative 
it is many and faulty, ••• yet it is identically the self~ 
same world • nl Evil and imperfection pertain only to • • • 
the relative world, the world of experience. They are "over-
comett in the perfection of the absolute. But, ~ays James, 
our experiences lie in the finite world. Its vicissitudes 
and imperfections are our prime concern. "What boots :it to 
tell me that the absolute way is the true way • n2 If • • • 
we could share the absolute's point of view, we might recog-
ntze the necessity or the illusion of imperfection, but we 
cannot share this point of view. Hence, it seems impossible 
that finite minds can be part of the infinite mind. ~he argu-
ment that finite minds have only a partial view because they 
are only part of the absolute does not help one understand 
or deal with experience. Since union with the omniscient 
absolute is not evidenced in experience, James cannot accept 
it as a hypothesis. 
The timeless characteristic of the absolute also is 
' 
incompatible with experience. 
/, 
Experience is never static. 
1. Ibid., p. 47. 2. Ibid., p. 48. 
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Everything has a history. The experience of change also is 
incompatible with a unity which must be changeless, since an 
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all-knower immediately knows it in its totality. The feeling 
of possibility and novelty also is invalidated by a system 
in which all reality is known at once by a supreme knower; 
once such a reality is ~stablished, it can contai~ no novelty. 
•"' 
¥' ttrt surely is a merit in a philosophy to make the very life 
J 
we lead seem real and earnest. nl The absolute does not 
accept the reality of experience, the only reality we have 
to deal with. Therefore, Jame~ rejects the union of all 
being in an absolute reality. He rejects formal monism. 
Peirce also rejects the type of absolute system out-
lined above, for he insists on evolutionary gr.owth, .change, 
and chance. Therefore, within his substantive monism he 
provides for novelty and possibility. 
For James the alternative to formal monism is formal 
pluralism, the doctrine that reality consists of parts which 
are not all interconnected. Sense or feeling experience is 
reality. Experience is a relation which is analogous to the 
absolute. As seen above, the absolute is a relation between 
an absolute mind and its content. For James, experience is 
a relation between the act of experiencing and the f'act which 
is experienced. In fact, each experience relation is a minor 
1 • . ~., p. 49. 
absolute; it knows all that it knows in an instant; it is 
everything that it encompasses within that instant. It 
differs from the absolute in that it is limited to a finite 
duration and it encompasses only a small portion of reality. 
Each personal consciousness is a plurality of such ex-
perience relations. Sin?e experience is reality, reality is 
a plurality of experience relations which are of a spirutual 
na~ure. Since, according to spiritualism, mind governs the 
universe, experience relations have original force. They can 
produce results and effect change. Therefore, there can be 
novelty. Each experience relation, even the smallest that 
can be cognized, has an earlier and later part, contains many 
feelings and sensations, and is so related to other experi-
ences that it is not possible to tell where one ends and the 
next begins. Thus each experience relation is continuous 
with at least some others. 
The plurality of experience relations is reminisc~nt 
of Leibniz' monadology. However, Leibniz' monads are 
correlatetl;' · each one reflects every other one. Jam~s 
rejects this ·~:. co·rrelaM•bn,·· of all reality. Finite monads 
do not know everything. 
Further, even though the conscious experiences which 
comprise a personality are continuous with each other, they 
are not connected in the same way with the experience 
continuum that constitutes another personality. In fac·t, 
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they are not connected in any way with the exper~ence continua 
of countless other personalities. 
This disconnection is not limited to interpersonal 
relationships. Reality contains both connection and dis-
connection. Each portion of reality has many relations. But 
a portion of r-eality "when actively engaged in one of these 
relations is no·t by that very fact engaged in all the other 
relations simultaneously. ul For instance, physical . . . 
objects have a mechanical relationship with some other physi-
cal objects, but all objects are not so related to all other 
objects, for some parts of the universe move when others do 
not. Further, things· relat.ed to the same thing are not by 
that fact related in the same way to each other. ~For instance, 
A knows B who in turn knows C, but A does not necessarily 
know c. Everything is rela4ed to many things, but nothing 
is related to everything else. 
" 
In all these modes of union, some parts of 
the world prove to be conjoined with other 
parts, so that if you choose your line of 
influence and your items rightly, you may 
travel from pole to pole without an inter-
ruption. If, however, you choose them 
wrongly, you meet with obstacles and non-
conductors from the outset, and cannot 
travel at all. There is thus neither abso-
lute oneness nor absolute manyness • • • 
but a mixture of well-definable modes of 
both.2 
I. J~mes" A;pu, pp ... ·322-3. 
2. James, SPOP, p. 127. 
0 
0 
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The same portion of reality may belong to many systems, 
"as when a man is connected with other objects by beat, l?Y 
gravitation, by love, and by knowledge. 111 Further, som~ 
systems are related to each other. For instance, "you c~not 
have a telephone system without air and copper connections, 
but you can have air and copper connections without tele-
phones. "2' 
James says reality consists of many systems of experi-
ence relations wbicb "seem , ••• to run alongside of each 
other--either irrelevantly, or where they interfere, leading 
to mutual frustration • • • • n3 
James's insistence on disconnection differs from 
Peirce's refusal to recognize any separation. He totally 
rejects a philosophy wbicb recognizes "unrelated chunks of 
being." (7.570) All things are related to all others. 
' The spiritual quality of all experience relations seems 
to be the one exception to James's doctrine that nothing is 
related to everything else. He rejects a monism of form but 
accepts a monism of kind. 
James enlarges his conception of the continuity ot per-
sonal consciousness and hypothesizes that just as the center 
of attention at each and every instant is "surrounded by a 
fringe tha.t shades i~sensibly into a subconscious more,:n 4 so 
1. ~-, p. 130. 
3. Ibi,d., p. 131. 
2.· Ibid. 
4. James. APU, p. 288. 
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might eaeh personal consciousness be part of the margin of 
"some more really central self in things which is co-conscious 
with the whole of us. nl That is, just as the center of 
. 
atteneion at any one moment is only part of a wider self, 
s~ might each personal consciousness be co-conscious with a 
wider spiritual consciousness, namely God. However, the 
experience relations are not part of the deity, for this' 
would envelop reality in an absolute monism. The presence of 
evil, error, ignorance, and illusion imply a distinction 
between existence and the deity. IJ!hle deity is one part 'of 
reality. Reality is not completely .interco~ected, although 
some parts of it are connected. 
James's pluralism accords with his conceptualism. Con-
ception is a unification of experiences as they pertain ·to 
one relation or quality. Each·bit of experience is plurally 
related and has many qualities; each relation and ea~h 
quality can be isolated in a conception which focuses on 
that aspect to the exclusion of all others. But conceptions 
do not represent experienced reality because they are privative. 
They ignore the multitude of relations, the many feelings and 
dim awareness in every experience. Thus, ~hey do not present 
a complete picture of reality. 
Formal monism often is guilty of a misuse of concepts 
1. Ibid., p. 290. 
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which James calls "vicious intellectualism." This is "the 
treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the 
name's definition fails positively to include ttl • • • • 
Every name is a concept, the meaning of which is explained in 
a definition. Vicious intellectualism begins when the reality 
represented by the concept is construed to exclude anything 
that is not specifically mentioned in the definitions. For 
instance, it assumes "that a person whom you have once called 
an 'equestrian' is thereby forever made unable to walk on his 
own feet. "2 Now, says Jame~, formal monism assumers that 
because pluralism admits disconnection in experience, it 
forever prohibits any kind of connection between the parts of 
experience. James says his philosophical opponents frequently 
exclaim: 
"But surely, SURELY there must be ~ 
connexion among things l" As if I must 
necessarily be an uncontrolled mono-
maniac insanely denying any connexion 
whatever. The whole question revolves 
in very truth about the word "some. 11 3 
Pluralism, as seen above, recognizes that some things are 
connected in some ways and that all things are disconnected 
from some things in at least some ways. "Disconnection" is 
a concept, which should not be used privatively. It does not 
1. Ibid., p. 60. 
' 2. Ibid. James draws the example from an unreferenced 
work by Sigwart. 
3. ~., pp. 78-9. 
0 
exclude connection. It merely points to disconnection. 
James says monism employs the ·concept o~ oneness 
privatively. Seizing on the fact that there is connection 
in experience, monists assume that all things are continuous 
and that everything is "One.u This concept is misus.ed to 
indicate that because oneness has no parts and cannot change, 
reality has no parts and is eternal. But, says Jam~s, 
"neither abstract oneness nor abstract independence exi'sts; 
only concrete real things exist • • • • nl "Onenessu and 
"independence" are concepts. I~ they are interpreted to 
exclude ~rom existence the qualities o~ experience not speci-
fied in their respective definitions, they misrepresent 
existence. 
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This position accords with James's belief that concepts, 
including universal concepts, have no extra-mental reality. 
Conception is a function o~ the mind whereby it groups and 
categorizes the impressions it receives ~rom existence. The 
referents of concepts are experienced particulars. The 
universality attributed to some concepts is imparted by the 
feeling that the conception, the mental classification, is 
intended to apply to all the particular experiences of a 
certain kind. The experiences, not the conceptions, are 
reality, and experience consists of sensations and feelings 
which are of a spiritual quality. 
1. ~., p. 59. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although Peirce and James are both pragmatists, there 
is a wide divergence in their thought. The following is a 
, general summary of the main differences discussed in this 
thesis. 
Peirce upholds the realist doctrine that general terms 
refer to possibilities and to ideas and laws which are 
realities apart from the particulars which manifest them and 
the minds which apprehend them. The real correspondents of 
general terms are within two realms of being: the realm of 
firstness, which is possibility and feeling; and the realm 
of thirdness, which is law, meaning, and thought, all of 
which are synonyms. Both differ from the world of existence, 
or secondness, in which possibility is actualized, and in 
which ideas, including laws, are physically and mentally 
operative. Actually, the three modes of being form a v~st 
continuum, all of which is of the nature of thought. Feeling 
is the most general part of the continuum. The association 
of feelings results in their delineation into general ideas. 
The world of existence istevolving from the interaction and 
delineation of ideas. Thus, existence is the least general 
part of a continuum of which feeling is the most general part. 
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Hence, the three modes of being all represent one kind of 
reality, namely thought. Within that ultimate mode of being, 
parts of reality are in relations of first, second, and 
third ~o each other. 
James maintains the conceptualistic position that 
general ideas are mental constructions which result from the 
intended meaning of universal application which attaches to 
some conceptions. Every substantive thought is surrounded by 
a "halo" of its.felt relations, one of which is the extent of 
its _application. This "halo" of felt relatio rs is the 
conscieus correlate of nascent nerve processes. Hence, 
general ideas refer to collections of particular experiences. 
Generals themselves are real only as mental constructions 
formulated by the comparison of particular experiences. 
For both philosophers experience is a relation w~th two 
terms, the exp~riencer and the experienced. Whether ttie one 
fact, experience, is to be considered as that which is ex-
perienced or as that which experiences, depends on the ,,view-
point from which we look at the fact. For Peirce, this 
relation has three modes, corresponding to the three modes 
of being all of which ultimately are modes of thought. For 
James, the experience relation ultimately reduces to feeling. 
James says that experience is reality. It is the only 
reality with which we must deal and therefore it is reality 
for us. To treat experience as the illusory surface of an 
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unknown principle is "animism." Thus, realit~ consists of 
a plurality of experience relations, which are feeling 
relations. Peirce would object to James's doctrine because 
it emphasizes the reality of felt experience. As a realist, 
Peirce emphasizes reality apart from that which is experi-
enced. 
Fr.om these different ideas of the nature of reality, 
Peirce and James develop completely different metaphysics. 
Continuity is of primary importance to both philosophers, 
but each conceives it differently. 
P"eirce 1 s idea of continuity involves "Kanticity," 
according to which a continuum is "that of which every 1part 
has its parts of the same kind." (1.168) Thus, a continuum 
comprises homogeneous parts. Peirce distinguishes Kanticity 
from infinite divisibility, although the continuum described 
in his definition might be infinitely divisible. James 
would consider Kanticity as a conception, a mental operation 
which can be applied to past experience but which does not 
describe experience as it is felt. Since James emphasizes 
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the reality of experience, he formulates an empirical defi-
nition of continuity which states that "anything is continu-
ous when its parts appear as immediate next neighbors, with 
absolutely nothing between. ttl Although infinite divisibility 
1. James, SPOP, p. 187. 
0 
0 
and Kanticity might apply to such a continuum, James's defi-
,, 
nition does not specify these criteria because they are, not 
experienced in the perceptual flux. Since James considers 
reality to be of the nature of experience, he defines conti-
nuity in terms of the immediately given experience, which 
does feel as though it is without break. His definition 
does not mention those elements which are not experienced, 
even though later they may be conceptually applied to ex-
perience. Thus, Peirce's definition of continuity is based 
on mathematical concepts which are not experienced. James 
rejects such concepts and bases his definition on qualities 
which are experienced. 
13'7 
Both philosophers establish the reality of cont·inuity 
by demonstrating that we experience it in personal conscious-
ness. Their arguments are analogous: both contend that 
immediate experience is eontinuous in that it spans a dura-
tion. However, for Peirce this duration is infinitesimal; 
for James it is finite. For Peirce immediate awareness is 
I 
the awareness of all instants of an infinitesimal interval 
during that interval. For James it is the distinct recog-
nition of a group of impressions as a group, and also the 
distinct recognition of the interval between impressions. 
Here again, Peirce retains the mathematical concepts of 
instant and infinitesimal; James concentrates on felt experi-
ence. Chapter III closely examines and compares their 
0 
0 
demonstrations. 
From their ideas of continuity and the continuity of 
thought, Peirce and James develop divergent metaphysical 
positions which accord with their respective positions 
regarding realism and conceptualism. 
For Peirce, continuity is a general idea which, like all 
ideas, produces both physical and mental effects. From the 
idea of continuity, all other realities have evolved. In 
the process of evolution, reality becomes less general and 
more definite. Feelings and ideas evolved from a more 
general continuum and the world of existence is a less 
general derivation of one of the ideal worlds. Thus, 
existence is a more definite part of the· continuum of 
thought and is of the nature of thought. Matter is the more 
mechanical, less general part of a continuum of which mind 
is the more ~eneral, less habit-bound part. 
In the existing world continuity also is manifest as 
~ 
' gener~l id~as and as tendencies which cause continuous repe-
tition of certain acts. These acts are manifestations of 
habits and laws. 
Synechism is the doctrine that all reality is continuous. 
i 
It admits no discontinuity whatever. Not only is mind,, con-
tinuous with matter, but the feelings and qualities of 
existence are the more definite part of a cont·inuum of more 
. . 
gene:r:al feelings and qualities. Personalities form a 
0 
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continuum of which the individuals are parts. Novelty is 
insured because chance is continuous. The search for 
knowledge must be continuous because evolution and change are 
continuous. 
Since all reality is of the nature of thought~ the 
continua of qualities, mind and matter~ personalities~ and 
e~rything else apparently are interconnected and constitute 
one vast continuum. 
The thought nature of all reality insures its contlnuous 
duration. Thoughts are signs~ the object of which mus~ be 
. " 
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another sign~ which in turn has a sign as its object. Fprther, 
every sign is interpreted by a succeeding sign, which is 
interpreted by another sign. An infinite regress both back-
ward and forward in time !nsures the continuity of reality 
throughout infinity. Since a sign must be a sign to some 
~ . 
mind~ Peirce says reality as such is a sign in the mind of 
God. Reality symbolizes His purpose, but since the object of 
a sign must be a sign, ad infinitum, God's purpose evidently 
is not an ultimate abject. 
Thus~ in accord with Peirce's realism, not only are 
general ideas living realities, but all ideas are living 
realities. All reality is o~ the nature of thought and all 
reality is continuous and interconnected. Thus, Peirce up-
holds both a material and a formal monism. 
In accordance with James's conceptualism, his reality 
" 
consists in experience relations. The range of feeling 
0 
0 
within experiences and the lack of demarcation between some of 
them are expressed by the concept of continuity. But James 
would consider Peirce's continuum of qualities and of person-
alities as a hypothesis which does not reflect experience. 
James insists upon a plurality of experience relations, some 
of which are connected with some others, but none of wh~ch 
are connected with all others. 
The continuity within personal experience suggests an 
analogy whereby each mind is co-conscious with a larger mind 
sympathetic to man's moral and ethical aspirations. There-
fore, although James insists on a formal pluralism, he adopts 
a spiritual monism whereby all reality is of a spiritual 
nature. He defines spiritualism as the doctrine that mind 
governs reality, but his mental reality is concerned with 
ethical as well as intellectual matters. Thus, James's 
reality consists of a multitude of experience relations 
which are of a spiritual nature. All are co-conscious with 
a larger consciousness sympathetic with man's ethical nature 
but distinct from it. The deity is one part of reality. 
Reality is not completely interconnected, although some parts 
of it are connected. 
Thus, structurally James insists on a formal pluralism, 
whereas Peirce proposes a formal monism withi~ which chance 
and growth permit development and novelty. Both philosophers 
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uphold an ontological monism, for James believes that all 
reality is spiritual and Peirce believes that all reality is 
thought. Although they agree that reality is of a mental 
nature, Peirce's concept of reality is derived principally 
from a rational, mathematical model, whereas James 1 s is: 
based primarily on an ethical model. 
0 
'0 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare and coR-
trast the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce and William 
James in two respects: (l) their ideas of reality and (2) 
their doctrines of the continuity of consciousness and its 
metaphysical implications. 
Chapter II traces their different theories of reality 
to basic differences in their metaphysical orientations. 
Peirce, as a metaphysical realist, maintains that genera1 
terms refer to ideas and laws which are realities apart 
from the particulars which manifest them and the minds 
which apprehend them. The real correspondents of general 
terms are within two realms of being: the realm of first-
ness, which is possibility and feeling; and the realm of 
thirdness, which is law, meaning, and thought, all of which 
. 
are synonymous. Both differ from the world of exXstence, or 
secondness, in which possibility is actualized, and in which 
ideas, including laws, are physically and mentally operative. 
James maintains the conceptualistic position that 
general ideas are mental construc.tions which res.ult from the 
intended meaning of universal application which attacnes to 
some conception. Every substantive thought is surrounded by 
a tthalou of its felt relations, one of which is the extent 
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of its application. Tbis "halo" of felt relations is tbe 
conscious correlate of nascent nerve processes. Hence, 
general ideas refer to collections of particular experiences. 
l 
Generals themselves are real only as mental constructions 
formulated by the comparison of particular experiences. 
For James, conception is the function by which the 
mind means to think the same as it thought on a previous oc-
ca,sion. Thus, conceptions result from the comparison of per-
ceptions which are derived from sensations, or feel~n~s. 
For James, all experience ultimately reduces to feel-
ing. Experience and the experiencing consciousness are two 
aspects of a relation which is itself part of experience. 
Thus, experience is a relation, which is feeling, between 
I 
two terms, the experiencing consciousness and experience, 
l:Dth of which are feeTing. 
For James, experience is the only reality which we 
know and with which we must deal. Thus, experience is 
reality fpr us. He postulates the cause of experience to be· 
of the same nature as experience. Thus, reality for James 
consists of a plurality of experience relations which are 
feeling relations. Peirce would object to James's doctrine 
because it emphasizes the reality of felt experience. As a 
realist, Peirce emphasizes reality apart from that which is 
experienced. 
I 
I 
I 
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Besides comparing the positions of the two writers, 
Chapter II notes some of the inconsistencies in Peirce's 
realism and questions some aspects of James's ~onceptualism. 
Chapter III examines and compares the metaphysics 
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which Peirce and James develop from their respective theories 
of reality. Both use-the continuity experienced in personal 
consciousness as their metaphysical model. Hence, the chapter 
begins by examining and comparing their respective ideas of 
continuity as it applies to consciousness. Peirce's defi-
nitions of continuity are mathematical and conceptual. James's 
definitions are based on experience as it is immediately felt. 
Then the chapter examines in detail the analogous arguments 
whereby Peirce and James demonstrate the continuity of thought. 
The different metaphysical positions which they devel~p 
therefrom accord with their metaphysical positions regarding 
realism and conceptualism. 
For Peirce, continuity is a general idea which, like 
all ideas, produces both physical and mental effects. From 
the idea of continuity, all other realities have evolved. 
In the pr~cess of evolution, reality becomes less .general 
, 
and more definite. Feelings and ideas evolved from a more 
general continuum and the world of existence is a less gen-
eral derivation of one of the ideal worlds. Thus, the three 
modes of being actually form a vast continuum, all of which 
is of the nature of thought. Existence is the least general 
part of a continuum of which feeling is the most general. 
Matter is the least general part of a continuum of which mind 
0 
0 
is more general. 
Synechism is the d0ctrine that all reality is con-
tinuous. It admits no discontinuity whatever. Not only is 
mind continuous with matter, but the feelings and qualities 
of existence are the more definite part of a continuum of 
more general feelings and qualities. Personalities for.m a 
' 
continuum of which the individuals are parts. Novelt:y is 
insured because chance is continuous. The search for know-
·14 9 
ledge must be continuous because evolution and change is con-
tinuous. 
Since all reality is of the nature of thought,- the 
continua of qualities, mind and matter, personalities, and 
everything else apparently are interconnected and constitute 
one vast continuum. 
The thought nature of all reality insures its con-
tinuous duration. Thoughts are signs, the object of,which 
must be another sign, which in turn has a sign as its obJect. 
Further, every sign is inte~preted by a succeeding sign, 
which is interpreted by another sign. An infinite regress 
both backward and forward in time insures the continqity ot 
reality throughout infinity. Since a sign.must be a sign to 
some mind, Peirce says reality as s~ch is a sign in the mind 
of God. Re·ality symbolizes His purpose, but since the ob-
ject of a sign must be a sign,~ infinitum, God's purpo~e 
evidently is not an ultimate object. 
• 
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Thus, in accord with Peirce's realism, not only are 
general ideas living realities, but all ideas are living 
realities. All reality is of the nature of thought and all 
!eality is continuous and interconnected. Thus, Peirce up-
holds both a material and a formal monism. 
For James, mathematical continuity and continuit~y as 
Kanticity are concepts which describe one aspec~. of felt ex-
periences. In accordance with his conceptualism, such conti-
nuity is not real other than as a concept; only particular 
felt experiences are real. The range of feeling within 
experie roes and the lack of demarcation between them are 
expressed by the concept of continuity. 
Unlike Peirce, James rejects the reality of a conti-
nuity which contradicts experience. Infinite divisi?ility 
and Kanticity are further concepts, mental operations which 
can be applied to past experience but which do not describe 
experience as it is felt. He would consider Peirce's con-
tinuum of qualities and of personalities as a hypothesis 
which does not reflect experience. Therefore, it is not as 
acceptable as the theory that the concept of ttdiscontinuity" 
also applies to experience. This concept expresses the fact 
that all experience relations do not connect with all others, 
although some experience relations are connected with some 
others. 
The continuity within personal experience suggests an 
analogy whereby each mind is co-conscious with a larger mind 
0 
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sympathetic to man's moral and ethical aspirations. There-
fore, although James insists on a formal pluralism, he 
adopts a spiritual monism whereby all reality is of a ,spiri-
tual nature. He defines spiritualism as the doctrine that 
mind governs reality, but his mental reality is concerned 
with ethical as well as intellectual matters. Thus, James's 
reality consists of a multitude of experience relations 
which are of a spiritual nature. All are co-conscious with 
a larger consciousness sympathetic with man's ethical nature 
but distinct from it. The deity is one of the parts of a 
reality which is not interconnected although some parts of 
it are connected. 
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Thus, structurally James insists on a formal plural-
ism, whereas Peirce proposes a formal monism within which 
chance and growth permit development and novelty. Both 
philosophers uphold an ontological monism, for James be-
lieves that all reality is spiritual and Peirce believes that 
all reality is thought. Although they agree that reality is 
of a mental nature, Peirce's concept of reality is derived 
·principally from a rational, mathematical model, whereas 
James's is based primarily on an ethical model. 
Chapter IV summarizes the main rindings or the 
thesis. 
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